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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD and
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD,
Plaintiffs and
Appellee,
vs.
AMERICAN MOTORS SALES
CORPORATION and JEEP
CORPORATION, LARRY ANDERSON,
VARIABLE ANNUITY LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Case No. 19,695
Defendants and
Appellants.
PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON REHEARING

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Appellee Stephen Whitehead respectfully submits this brief
for consideration by the Court in its rehearing of this case.
This brief will incorporate and restate, with modifications,
Whitehead's arguments made in his Petition for Rehearing dated
February 28, 1989, and in Appellee's Reply to Appellant's Answer
to Petition for Rehearing dated April 13, 1989.

Whitehead will

not reargue in this brief the points which were affirmed on
appeal.
Appellee (petitioner on rehearing) Stephen Whitehead will
be referred to herein as "plaintiff" or as "Whitehead."

The

claims of Deborah Whitehead were settled at trial, and she was
not a party to the appeal.

Appellants (respondents on rehear-
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ing) American Motors Sales Corporation and Jeep Corporation will
be referred to compositely as MAMC/Jeepfl or "defendants."
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is a civil case which was tried to a jury.

Defendants

appealed, and this Court reversed the verdict and judgment in a
divided opinion.

Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 101

Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Feb. 2, 1989).
for rehearing on February 28, 1989.

Whitehead filed a petition
(Whitehead had previously

obtained an order extending the time for filing the petition to
March 2, 1989.)

The petition was granted by order dated July

12, 1989.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1989) and R. Utah S. Ct. 35.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the majority opinion give proper deference to the

trial court's determination as to what were the critical aspects
of plaintiff's case?
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in limiting

cross-examination of plaintiff's experts where the subject of
the cross-examination was not a critical aspect of plaintiff's
proof and where the defendants did not rephrase objectionable
questions?
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding

defendants' exhibits which were not produced in response to pretrial discovery requests?
2
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4.

May this Court consider defendants1 claims of error

with respect to the exclusion of exhibits, where the exhibits
were not made part of the record on appeal and the relevancy and
the materiality of the exhibits cannot be determined from the
record?
5.

May

a

reversal

be

based

upon

an

accumulation

of

errors, no one of which is substantial or prejudicial?
6.

In the

event this Court

should

reverse the trial

court, should any retrial be limited to liability only, where
the liability and damage aspects of proof were separable and
were actually

separated at trial, and where defendants have

claimed no error in the damage phase of the trial?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Plaintiff is not aware of any constitutional provisions,
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation
is determinative of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature

of the

Case.

This

is a strict

liability

product action which was tried to a jury.
B.

Course

of

Proceedings.

Plaintiffs

original complaint on November 21, 1979.

filed

(R. 7-8.)

their
Trial

commenced on October 17 and continued through November 4, 1983.
(R. 1669-1703.)

The jury found the issues in favor of plain-

tiff, and a Judgment on the Verdict was entered on November 8,
1983, awarding judgment in favor of plaintiff comprising of
3
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special

damages

of

$41,320.85,

$1,511,000.00 plus costs of court.

and

general

(R. 1362-64.)

damages

of

The judgment

remains unpaid.
This court filed an opinion on February 2, 1989, reversing
the judgment and jury verdict.
Sales

Corporation , 101 Utah

Whitehead

filed

timely

Whitehead v. American Motors

Adv.

petition

Rep.
for

27

(Feb.

rehearing,

2,

1989).

which

was

subsequently granted by this court.
C.

Statement of Facts.

On October 16, 1979, on a clear

afternoon, Stephen Whitehead and his wife of one year, Deborah
Whitehead, were driving a Jeep Commando south on Interstate 15
near Orem, Utah County, Utah.

Although the vehicle was bor-

rowed, Deborah Whitehead had driven it several times before.
Stephen Whitehead had just completed his working day and the
couple had arranged to meet at a commuter parking area along the
freeway.

Because Deborah had prepared Stephen's dinner for him,

she drove the vehicle while Stephen rode as a passenger in the
right front seat.
While

driving

(R. 2145-2147, 2155.)
approximately

50-55

miles

per

hour,

the

Whitehead vehicle was struck from behind by a 1978 Oldsmobile
driven by Larry Anderson.

(R. 2147, 2151).

The Oldsmobile was

moving at a speed of approximately 65-7 0 miles per hour.

The

right front of the Oldsmobile contacted the left rear of the
Whitehead vehicle.
over.

The Commando went out of control and rolled

(R. 2151, 2152.)

4
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As

a

result

of

the

collision

and

roll-over,

Deborah

Whitehead received multiple head and limb lacerations as well as
various bruises and abrasions.
Stephen

Whitehead

injury to his spinal

was

(R. 2152.)

severely

injured.

chord at the thoracic

He

sustained

level of T-ll,

(approximately four inches above the belt level), abrasions over
his shoulders and upper portion of his back, associated tenderness over the left shoulder, abrasions on his hands and shins,
and a severely broken leg

(femur bone) .

The injury to the

spinal chord paralyzed Stephen Whitehead from the waist down and
rendered him a permanent paraplegic.

(R. 2254-2257.)

Naming Larry Anderson as defendant, plaintiffs filed their
original complaint on November 21, 1979, and through amended
complaint,

subsequently

added

AMC/Jeep.

(R. 7-8, 84-87.)

Anderson's

employer

and

Trial commenced on October 17,

1983, and a judgment was entered November 8, 1983.
13 64.)

VALIC

(R. 1362-

The trial court denied AMC/Jeep1s Motion for Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative for a New
Trial.
The

(R. 1642-1644.)
issues

on

appeal

relate

mainly

to

the

procedural

history of the case, both before and during trial.

The facts

relative to those issues are set forth as part of the argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This appeal sought appellate review of a two and one-half
week jury trial in a complex products liability case.

The trial

court, with proper judicial vigor in the management and stream5
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lining of the case, maintained strict control over the scope of
cross-examination and the admission of evidence.

Defendants now

claim that the trial court erred in certain of its decisions.
This

Court

is required

to

give

a trial

judge

a wide

latitude of discretion in the management of a complex trial.
Cross-examination may be limited; a limitation is reversible
only if it prejudicially limits a party's ability to challenge a
critical aspect of the opponent's case.

In reviewing the trial

court's decision, therefore, this Court must first ascertain
what the trial court had determined to be the critical aspects
of the plaintiff's case and then consider whether the trial
court abused its discretion in making that determination.

Only

then can this Court consider whether the trial court abused its
discretion in limiting cross-examination.
in this case

failed

The majority opinion

to give proper deference to the trial

court's determination that comparison with other vehicles was
not a critical aspect of plaintiff's case.
were irrelevant and inadmissible.

Such comparisons

The few comparative state-

ments which were made by plaintiff's experts were minor and
insignificant when compared with the main thrust of plaintiff's
case.
to

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing

allow

potentially

confusing

cross-examination

into

those

areas.
Defendants also claimed error in the exclusion of certain
exhibits.

The exhibits themselves were not made part of the

record on appeal, and their materiality cannot be determined
6
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from the existing record.
of their exclusion.

This alone prevents appellate review

The exhibits moreover were within the scope

of several of plaintiff's discovery requests.

The defendants1

failures to respond to discovery had been the primary subject of
the lengthy pre-trial proceedings in this case, and given that
context,

the

trial

court

did

not

abuse

its

discretion

in

excluding the exhibits at trial.
Even if the trial court did err in some of its rulings,
however, the rulings did not deprive the defendants of a fair
trial.

Insubstantial

and

nonprejudicial

errors may not be

accumulated; the majority opinion erred in so doing in this
case.
Finally, and as an alternative only, in the event this
Court determines

to reverse

the jury verdict, the

should be limited to liability only.
the damage aspects of the trial.

reversal

No error was claimed in

Proof on damages was separate

and distinct from the proof on liability.

No just reason exists

to allow defendants a second opportunity to contest damages.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
WERE WITHIN ITS DISCRETION UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
A.

Introduction.

The majority opinion's reversal is based on two primary
claims of error.

The first is that the trial court abused its
7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

discretion in limiting cross-examination of plaintiff's experts
Anderson and Noettl concerning the handling characteristics of
other vehicles.

The second category of errors is the exclusion

of three of the defense exhibits:

a Heitzman film on Jeep CJ-

5's, a Heitzman film on rollovers of non-Jeep vehicles, and a
"storyboard"

(Exhibit 130) offered to illustrate Dr. Warner's

claim that the Jeep Commando roof had been damaged in a prior
accident.
B.

These claims of error will be addressed in order.
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
Limiting Cross-Examination Of Plaintiff's Experts.

In

The majority opinion holds that the trial court erred in
limiting

defendants1

cross-examination

of plaintiff's

expert

witnesses, and asserts that defendants were "repeatedly" cut off
during

their

attempts

to

cross-examine

Whitehead, 101 Utah Adv. Rep, at 29.

plaintiff's

experts.

The examples given by the

majority opinion concern exclusively instances where the trial
court would not allow cross-examination involving comparisons
with other vehicles.
As succinctly as possible, plaintiff will show that (1) the
majority opinion fails to give proper deference to the trial
court's determination
plaintiff's proof.

of what were the

critical

aspects of

Any comparisons the plaintiff's experts made

between Jeeps and other vehicles were not and could not have
been a critical aspect of plaintiff's proof.

Plaintiff will

also show that defendants were in fact allowed extensive crossexamination

of

plaintiff's

experts
8

about

other
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vehicles.

Defendants were not prejudiced by any rulings of the trial court
on specific isolated questions.
1.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
Determining That Comparison With Other Vehicles
Was Not A Critical Aspect Of Plaintiff's Proof.

A limitation of cross-examination may not be grounds for
reversal unless it (1) involves a critical aspect of plaintiff's
proof, Whitehead, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28, or a key issue in
the case, id. at 29, and (2) clearly prejudices the defendant's
ability to develop his case.
(Utah 1975) .

State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746

Doubts should be resolved in favor of affirming

the trial court:
On appeal, the cross-examination of opposing
lawyers must be carefully scanned and every
doubt resolved in favor of the ruling made
by the trial court.
Prejudicial error
should not be declared unless doubt disappears and the ruling of the court is
clearly untenable.
Joiola v. Baldridge Lumber Co., 96 N.M. 761, 635 P.2d 316, 319
(Ct. App. 1981).
These decisions establish that a multi-step process must be
used in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in limiting cross-examination.

First, this Court must

ascertain what the trial court determined to be the critical
aspects of plaintiff's case.

This Court must then evaluate

whether the trial court abused its discretion in making that
determination.

Only then may the Court consider whether the

limitation of cross-examination prevented the defendants from
having a fair trial.
9
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An examination of the record in this case reveals that a
comparison of vehicles was not a critical aspect of plaintiff's
proof.1

Although some of plaintiff's experts did make some

oblique references

to the handling

characteristics

of other

vehicles, plaintiff's experts did not "repeatedly" draw comparisons of the rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles and nonJeep vehicles, as contended by the majority opinion.
Adv. Rep. at 31.

101 Utah

More importantly, the record does not compel

the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining that whatever references may have been made to other
vehicles did not constitute a critical aspect of plaintiff's
proof.
The majority

opinion

cites

a few

isolated

examples

in

support of its claim that comparisons with other vehicles was a
critical aspect of plaintiff's proof.

Plaintiff has not been

able to discover any comparisons with other vehicles beyond
those cited by the majority opinion.

An analysis of those few

instances reveals that the comparisons were only incidental not
"repeated", and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that they were not a critical aspect of plaintiff's
proof.
The first example given by the majority opinion of comparisons with other vehicles is the testimony of Mr. Anderson.

x

Indeed, evidence of the rollover propensities of other
vehicles (industry standards) would not have been relevant or
admissible. E.g., Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337,
1341 (9th Cir. 1986).
10
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The exchange referred to in the majority opinion, 101 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 29, and quoted in the dissenting opinion, 101 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 33, is the total extent of Anderson's alleged comparisons of other vehicles.

The critical aspect of the tes-

timony was as follows:
Q: And what did the results show in regard
to your tests on the Jeep itself?
A: Well, all the results are preliminary.
I don't have all the data reduced yet. But
my preliminary quick look at that data
indicates that the Jeep vehicles both
overturn at speeds of 2 0 to 25 miles an
hour, and they both have a delay in the
handling response that's in the magnitude of
a half a second before the vehicle is
stabilized to turn.
The other vehicles I tested, the S10
Blazer and the Chevy Chevette, they did not
have delays of that magnitude.
They were
much less.
101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33 (R. 2676).
The only "comparison" made in this quotation is in the
delay in the handling response.

There is no comparison of the

speeds at which the Jeep would roll over as compared with the
other vehicles.

Mr. Anderson only testified

that the Jeep

vehicles would overturn at speeds of 2 0 to 25 miles an hour. He
did not state how that compared with the other vehicles tested.
The majority also held that defendants were limited in
their cross-examination of Mr. Noettl because they were not able
to

inquire

as

to

his

experience

or prove

his

credibility

regarding "his testimony that it is difficult to roll a passenger car."

The majority opinion implies that comparison to other
11
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vehicles was a critical aspect of Mr. Noettl1s testimony.

As

with the testimony of Mr. Anderson, a review of the factual
context

of

Mr.

Noettlfs

testimony

demonstrates

the

insig-

nificance of his comment about "other vehicles" and any subsequent

probing

attorney,

Mr.

by

AMC/Jeep.

Jensen,

Earlier

implied

that

in

trial,

perhaps

Mr.

AMC/Jeepfs
Noettl

had

performed the tests with preconceived notions as to the Jeep's
turnover propensities, and then
achieve the desired effect.

filmed

the

tests merely

to

To rebut this implication, in re-

direct examination, the plaintiff's attorneys asked Mr. Noettl a
question to demonstrate that he was without prior knowledge as
to turnover propensities of a jeep as compared to any vehicle:
Q. [by Mr. Johnson] When you started
out with this particular test did you know
•exactly what speeds and what input it would
take to turn the CJ-5 over?
A.
No, absolutely.
It was just the
opposite. That the belief was that since it
was very difficult to turn a passenger car
over, especially on a flat surface at low
speeds, that it would be difficult to do
this with a Jeep, too.
(R. 3039)
Mr. Noettl did not say it was harder or easier to roll a
passenger vehicle or a jeep—he simply explained that he went
into the test open-minded.
Finally, the majority opinion also refers to the testimony
of Mr. Shaw as being offered to show that the Commando was
easier to roll than other vehicles.
mony

An analysis of the testi-

of Mr. Shaw, who was plaintiff's

first expert on the
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rollover tendencies of the Commando, illustrates that it was the
defendants, not the plaintiff, that attempted

to make com-

parisons an issue in this case.
During an entire morning of direct examination covering 88
pages of transcript

(R. 2407-95) , Mr. Shaw made one isolated

reference to the rollover propensities of a Commando as compared
to other vehicles:
Q
(By Mr. Howard) All right. Now,
do you believe there is a causal connection
between the rollover of the Jeep and its
handling characteristics?
A
Well, there's no doubt that this
vehicle is much more prone to roll over than
some others and therefore could be, is
causal to the fact that it did roll over.
(R. 2495.)
The primary thrust of Mr. Shaw's testimony, however, was
that a safe vehicle should be able to perform certain emergency
manuevers at highway speeds (R. 2441-42), and that the Commando
was defective because it would roll at 25 miles per hour when
performing those emergency manuevers. (R. 2443.)

The comparison

was between the reasonably foreseeable use of the Commando and
its performance under those conditions.

No comparison with

other vehicles was attempted.
The

defense

on

cross-examination,

however, did

extensively into comparisons with other vehicles.
2619.)

inquire

(R. 2520,

In response to the cross-examination, plaintiff did

offer an exhibit giving the actual figures for the comparisons
which

the defense

had

elicited.

(R. 2628.)
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Plaintiff had

previously

offered

a portion

of the

same exhibit, but had

deleted the comparisons with other vehicles.

It was only after

the defense had inquired into the matter that the plaintiff
offered the entire exhibit. (R. 2629.)
These examples do not constitute
between Jeep and non-Jeep vehicles.
that is not the proper test.

"repeated"

comparisons

Even if they did, however,

The question is whether the trial

court abused its discretion in determining that comparisons with
other vehicles was not a critical aspect of plaintiff's proof.
Although members of this Court may have reached a different
conclusion, it cannot be said that the trial court's decision
was so wrong as to constitute an abuse of discretion.

The trial

court was in the advantaged position of being present at trial
and had a feel for the thrust of the plaintiff's case.

The main

thrust of the plaintiff's case was that the Jeep Commando had an
unreasonably dangerous propensity to overturn when performing
reasonably

foreseeable

evasive

maneuvers

at highway

speeds.

Allowing detailed cross-examination into comparisons with other
vehicles would have greatly multiplied the length and complexity
of the trial.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

limiting cross-examination.
2.

Any Limitation Of Cross-Examination Was Not Prejudicial .

An analysis of Mr. Jensen's cross-examination proves that
the trial court was in fact extremely generous to the defendants. During the defendants' 116 page cross-examination of Mr.
14
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Anderson,

the

plaintiff

made

51

objections,

only

21

were

sustained.
This indicates, contrary to the majority's opinion, that
Judge Bullock gave broad latitude to the defendants to test
Anderson's credibility.

For example, approximately 40 pages

before the exchange cited by the majority, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at
29, the following examination took place:
[Q] [By Mr. Jensen] And isn't it also a
fact, that many vehicles, if not most
vehicles, that are out of control and hit
the median, roll? Roll over?
MR. HOWARD:
Objection.
It's irrelevant and immaterial. It has no probative value.
THE COURT:
answer.

Cross-examination.

He may

(R. 2742-43)
Just

three

pages

prior

to

the

exchange

cited

by

the

majority, AMC/Jeep asked the following:
Q.
Now, I take it that any vehicle
that' s on the road today can be made to
roll, giving the right steering input, and
speed, and environment.
MR. HOWARD: Objection; no foundation,
outside the scope of direct examination.
THE COURT:
He may answer.
Whether
it's appropriate or not, I have some
question, but go ahead.
(R. 2779)
And just two pages before the alleged offending abuses of
discretion the following took place:
Q.
(By Mr. Jensen) Well, are there
vehicles besides Jeeps that roll over?
15
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MR. HOWARD:
Objection, Your Honor.
We'll stipulate there are.
Q.
(By Mr. Jensen)
emergency situations?
MR. HOWARD:
laid.

In driving and in

Objection, no foundation

THE COURT:
It does call for a
speculative answer.
Be more specific than
that.
(R.2779-80)
These represent only a few of the numerous occasions where
the trial court allowed the defendants to push the outside of
the envelope and go to the very boundaries of relevant crossexamination.

The trial court did not limit the defendants in

any way, rather

it simply kept the defendants

from opening

Pandora's box regarding other defective vehicles and tests of
other vehicles.

The limitation was entirely consistent with the

law and far from an abuse of discretion.

The trial court's

rulings reflect its desire to keep the case within manageable
proportions and consistent with its pre-trial rulings.

A review

of Mr. Anderson's testimony clearly shows that the trial court
bent over backward to allow the defendants ample and effective
cross-examination and that any limitation upon the defendants'
cross-examination

did

not

go

to

a

critical

aspect

of

the

plaintiff's proof.
A review of the testimony of Mr. Noettl similarly shows
that the trial court did indeed allow the defense attorney to
question

Mr.

Noettlfs

credibility

and

knowledge
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of

other

vehicles.

Please compare the quote in the majority opinion 101

Utah Adv. Rep. at 2 9 to that portion of the transcript where the
trial court allowed the same type of examination complained of.
The majority opinion states:
In
testifying
for plaintiff, Mr.
Noettl, another expert witness, testified:
"It was very difficult to turn a passenger
car over."
On cross-examination, he was
asked the basis of this opinion.
Q:
What experience have you had
in trying to rollover [sic] a
passenger vehicle?
MR. JOHNSON:
Object
basis of relevancy.

on

the

Court:
I don't want to get into
testing
all
other
kinds
of
vehicles, because we've got enough
problems with the one.
So, I'm
going to sustain the objection.
Contrary to the statement in the dissenting
opinion, it is clear that by inquiring as to
his experience, defendants were attempting
to probe the expert's credibility and the
foundation for his testimony that it is
difficult to roll a passenger car.
Whitehead, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29.
Now compare this alleged abuse in not allowing AMC/Jeep to
cross-examine
exchange.

Mr. Noettl

Immediately

in this

after

area

the trial

to the
court

rest

sustained

objection quoted by the majority, the exchange continued:
Q:
(By Mr. Jensen) Is it difficult to roll
over utility vehicles?
MR. JOHNSON:
Object, without
the
same
conditions. If he wants to make a point as
it relates to similar vehicles under the
circumstances —
17
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of the
the

THE COURT:
Yes, I'm going
that you define the question —

to

require

MR. JENSEN:
I don't know how I get
through the credibility, Your Honor, of a
man who says something about one vehicle and
we can't look at anything he's done or knows
about other vehicles. We'll submit it.
THE COURT:
Well, I'm going to permit it,
and subject to a motion to strike if it
doesn't go to credibility.
Q: (By Mr. Jensen) Is it difficult to turn
over, roll over, utility vehicles?
A:
Well, in my opinion the difficulty
would be increased, would be more than the
CJ vehicles. Probably somewhat less than a
passenger car, though. It would be somewhat
less difficult than a passenger car.
Q:

In the same range?

A.

As what?

Q:

As the CJ, same range of difficulty?

A:
I don't know
question. Maybe —

if

I

understand

your

MR. JOHNSON:
I might be totally oblivious
to it, but if this goes to credibility, I
cannot see it.
THE COURT:
All right. You'll have your
opportunity for a motion to strike, but you
may proceed.
MR. JENSEN:

All right.

Q:
[by Mr. Jensen] You
say
it's
more
difficult to roll over some other utility
vehicle comparing a CJ to another utility
vehicle in its class?
A:

That would be my opinion, yes.

Q:

Have you done that?

A:

No.

I have —

"have you tested it"?
18
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Q:

Yes.

A:
No. I have not tested such things as a
Blazer, anything like that, no.
Q:
All right.
For all you know, they
might turn over just the same as at the same
propensity.
A:
I would bet that they would not, based
on basic engineering principles.
Q:

What about vans?

A:
Vans, I think you'd have to explain
that, what type of van.
Q:

You name the kind of van.

A:
You mean like a Ford Econoline, things
of that nature?
Q:

Yes.

A:
I haven't dynamically tested them, I
would have to measure the track width and CG
height to give you an answer whether or not
they were as susceptible to rollover as a
CJ.
Q:

What about campers?

A:
Campers, again, I'd measure CG height,
I'd measure the track width, and I've given
you my opinion as to whether or not they
would roll as easy as a CJ vehicle, that's
correct.
Q:
Somebody
who's
had
experience
in
handling vehicles and testing them would
certainly be better equipped than you to
tell what the actual is, as far as anyone
can determine, when a given vehicle will
roll or not in any given situation?
A:
Well, I don't know how to answer that
one.
Q:
I'm talking about somebody who tests
vehicles considerably in that regard, drives
them and on test facilities and so forth.
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A:
Again, I can't answer that question.
All I can talk about is our tests, the
results of our tests, as far as the roll
threshold of being around .7 degrees has
been used by the manufacturers to verify
that, yes, the vehicle does indeed roll at
that.
So I don't know, they used the
results of our tests to identify the roll
threshold of their vehicles.
(R. 3043-46.)
This quotation illustrates that the trial court allowed,
over objection, AMC/Jeep to cross-examine Mr. Noettl about all
kinds of "other vehicles," including utility vehicles, vans and
campers.

Defendants were allowed to show that Mr. Noettl had

not tested other vehicles, and that his testimony was not based
on experience gained from extensive testing.
It is respectfully submitted that there was little limit
placed

on

cross-examination

regarding

"passenger

vehicles."

Many of the objections which the trial court sustained, as
explained

by

the

dissent,

101 Utah

Adv. Rep.

sustained based on the form of the question.

at

35, were

Defendants waived

any error by failing to restate the questions.
Passenger vehicles were not an issue in the case and only
obliquely compared by plaintiff's experts to Jeeps, and certainly there is no prejudice in any limitation the trial court may
have placed on cross-examination into that complex issue.
C.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
Excluding The Heitzman Film Concerning CJ-5 Handling
Abilities.

The majority opinion in this case held that the trial court
erred in excluding three of defendants' exhibits.
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The first

discussed was a video tape apparently showing CJ-5!s successfully negotiating emergency maneuvers.

This film was offered

through Mr. Heitzman, an expert witness called by the defendants
to

testify

vehicles.

regarding

the

handling

characteristics

of

Jeep

The trial court denied admission of the film.

The trial court's ruling must be affirmed.
was not made part of the record on appeal.

First, the film
Second, the film

should have been produced in response to plaintiff's discovery
requests, but was not.
sanction.

These arguments will be addressed in order.
1.

The
improperly

Exclusion of the film was an appropriate

Accepted Rules Of Appellate Review Preclude This
Court From Ruling On The Admissibility Of
Evidence Which Was Not Made Part Of The Record On
Appeal.

majority
excluded

opinion
a

film

concludes
of CJ-5

that

the

trial

testing, a second

court
film

showing rollovers by non-Jeep vehicles, and Exhibit 130 (story
board) .

(Although it is not clear from the opinion or the

underlying briefs, the undersigned counsel believes the films
the Court was referring to are Exhibits 95 (Bootleg and Lane
Change Film) and 96 (Pocobello Film).)

These exhibits, however,

were never before this Court for examination nor made part of
the record on appeal.

The defendants1

failure to make the

exhibits part of the record is fatal to appellate review of any
error in their exclusion.
At the time they filed their notice of appeal, AMC/Jeep
filed a designation

of record which stated that the record
21
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should include "all pleadings, documents, and evidence."
1661.)

(R.

Whitehead argued in the initial Brief of Respondents

Deborah Whitehead and Stephen Whitehead dated August 2, 1984 (at
page

45) , and

renews

the

argument

here,

that

matters

not

admitted into evidence and not part of the record cannot be
reviewed on appeal.

Pilcher v. State, 663 P. 2d 450, 453 (Utah

1983) (matters not admitted into evidence and not part of the
record cannot be considered by appellate court) (citing In re
Estate of Cluff, 587 P.2d 128, 128 n.l (Utah 1978); Corbet v.
Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430, 433 (1970)).

Exhibits

which were offered but not admitted are not evidence, and were
not part of the record designated by defendants.

The exhibits

were not indexed as part of the record (R. 1712) , and were not
included in the documents transmitted to this Court.

(See R.

1722-36.)
The accepted rule on appeal is that it is the burden of the
party complaining of the court's ruling to demonstrate the trial
court's error by making the record available for consideration.
This Court has specifically so held where the appellant failed
to include jury instructions in the record, Bennion v. LeGrand
Johnson Construction Co., 701 P. 2d 1078 (Utah 1985), failed to
include necessary transcription, Clendenen v. Western Ready Mix
Concrete Corp., 688 P.2d 477 (Utah 1984), or failed to include
depositions,
Schamanek,

First

684 P.2d

Federal
1257

Savings

&

(Utah 1984).

Loan

Association

v.

The Texas Court of

Appeals in Roberts v. Greenstreet, 593 S.W. 2d 119 (Texas Civ.
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App. 1979), applied this rule in the specific case of documentary exhibits and held:

"Without having these exhibits before

us, we are unable to evaluate any of Appellant's points of
error."

Id. at 121.

The Court cannot make a considered judgment concerning the
relevance of evidence and the prejudicial effect of its exclusion without having that evidence before it.

Where AMC/Jeep

did not fulfill their duty to preserve those exhibits as part of
the record on appeal, the claims of error relating to those
exhibits must fail.
2.

The Heitzman CJ-5 Film Was Properly Excluded For
Defendants1 Failure To Comply With Plaintifffs
Discovery Requests.

The majority ruling in this case limits a trial court's
ability to enforce this Court's repeated admonitions to the bar
to take the high road and deal openly and fairly with the other
side.

E.g., Error v. Western Home Insurance Co., 762 P.2d 1077,

1083 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J, concurring).
The trial court specifically found that the defendants AMC
and Jeep had failed to comply with discovery requests concerning
expert materials and exhibits:
THE COURT: I'm ready to rule. And I
think that in the context of all of the
circumstances in [sic] with respect to
discovery procedures which have heretofore
been taken in this case, I think the
Plaintiffs were entitled to have, or to see,
the films and test results before the trial
pursuant to their discovery interrogatories.
And in accordance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure and consistent with the prior
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rulings of this Court, and another division
of this Court, the films are not admissable.
(R. 3353)(emphasis added)•
It is clear from the record that AMC/Jeep were playing
"hardball" in their approach to discovery responses.

The trial

court determined that such gamesmanship was unfair and specifically excluded AMC/Jeepfs films as a sanction for AMC/Jeep's
failure to make proper discovery responses.
below

shows that this

Court misapprehended

The discussion
the

procedural context of the trial court's rulings.

factual

and

The rulings

were in fact correct under the circumstances.
Plaintiffs submitted five sets of interrogatories addressed
to American Motors Sales Corporation or Jeep Corporation, or
both:

Interrogatories, dated March 4, 1981 (R. 117-28) (Copy

attached at Appendix "B"); Interrogatories to Defendant American
Motors, dated September 15, 1981 (R. 238-46) (Copy attached as
Appendix " C " ) ; Interrogatories to Defendant Jeep Corporation,
dated September 24, 1981 (R. 247-56) (Copy attached as Appendix
"D") ; Interrogatories, dated August 3, 1983 (R. 907-11) (Copy
attached as Appendix "E") ; and Interrogatories, dated August 16,
1983

(R. 915-16).

The first three sets of interrogatories,

generally speaking, sought information concerning the design and
development

of

the

Jeep

Commando,

and

also

concerning

any

testing of the handling characteristics of the Jeep Commando.
The fourth set of interrogatories, generally speaking, sought
information concerning defendant's expert witnesses.
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The fifth

set of interrogatories sought information concerning insurance
coverage.
In

addition,

interrogatories

defendant

to AMC/Jeep

Larry

Anderson

on April

5,

also

submitted

1983, which

sought

discovery of the names of all witnesses and the identification
of all exhibits.
AMC/Jeep's
three

sets

of

(R. 806-08; copy attached as Appendix "F.").
evasive

and

incomplete answers to the first

interrogatories

were the

subject

of pretrial

motions to compel and hearings, as is set forth in more detail
in

the

initial

Brief

of

Respondents

Deborah

Whitehead

and

AMC/Jeepfs only response to

Stephen Whitehead at pages 5-19.

the fourth set of interrogatories, which requested information
concerning expert witnesses and their exhibits, was an objection
that

asserted

that

AMC/Jeep

had

no

obligation

beyond

identification of the names of the expert witnesses.
99).

mere

(R. 997-

It appears from the record that no response whatsoever was

made to plaintiff's

fifth set of

interrogatories

insurance coverage), nor to Larry Anderson's

(regarding

interrogatories

regarding witnesses and exhibits.
It is obvious that plaintiff and other parties had clearly
sought to discover, prior to trial, the names of AMC/Jeep's
experts and

an

identification

of any exhibits, particularly

those exhibits which had been relied upon by expert witnesses.
It was

nevertheless

not

until

the

middle

of

trial, after

plaintiff's experts had been excused and during the presentation
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of the defendant's evidence, that AMC/Jeep first disclosed that
it intended to offer the Heitzman films.

(R. 3345-3356.)

In response to the trial court's inquiry as to why AMC/Jeep
had not disclosed the existence of the films earlier (R. 3345),
AMC/Jeep gave the following four excuses: (1) the interrogatories referred to tests during the development of the Commando
only, and not to testing unrelated to the development process
(R. 3339,

3352);

(2) the tests were not performed

by Jeep

personnel, but rather by Jeep's attorneys or experts hired by
Jeep's attorneys

(R. 3341, 3346-47);

(3) plaintiffs had re-

quested only information regarding testing of Commandos, and not
other jeeps (R. 3340-41); and (4) the tests were privileged from
pretrial disclosure as attorney work product

(R. 3358).

An

example of this duplicitous gamesmanship was Mr. Mandlebaum's
response to the trial court when asked why the films had not
been disclosed:
[MR. MANDLEBAUM:]
It was not done by Jeep
Corporation and I suspect that the designers
and engineers of Jeep Corporation have never
seen nor heard of this test. It was done at
the request of lawyers, specifically for
litigation.
We
Honor—

raised

this

test

earlier,

THE COURT:
Wait a minute.
lawyers and which litigation?
MR.
MANDLEBAUM:
requested it?
THE COURT:

Which

Your
Which

lawyers

Yes, and which litigation?

MR. MANDLEBAUM: It was requested by a
law firm named JOSLIN AND TREAT, and at the
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request of general counsel of American
Motors Corporation. And it was done for a
series of tests, Your Honor, series of cases
rather.
(R. 3341.)
After considering the extensive arguments of counsel (R.
3337-53) and being familiar with the entire record, the trial
court ruled that the films were not admissible (see the quotation of the ruling infra at page 23).
The issue before this court is whether that ruling constituted an abuse of discretion under all the circumstances of the
case.

A review of each of the four excuses offered by AMC/Jeep

for its failure to disclose the film's existence demonstrates
that the trial court's ruling was well within its discretion.
i.

Plaintiff's
Interrogatories
Sought
Disclosure of All Testing Relating to the
Handling Characteristics of the Commando,
Not Just Testing During the Development
Stages.

The first excuse offered by AMC/Jeep for not producing the
films until the middle of trial was that plaintiff interrogatories only requested disclosure of testing during the development of the Commando, and the subjects films did not relate to
development.

The interrogatories were not, however, limited to

development tests.

For example, the first set of interroga-

tories included the following:
34. State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested for or otherwise evaluated
the affect [sic] of the short wheel base of
the Jeep Commando automobile on its resistance to roll-over
either during the
development of said automobiles or subse27
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quent to the
automobiles.

initial

production

of

said

36. State whether American Motors Corporation has tested for or otherwise evaluated
the effect of the track width of the Jeep
Commando automobile on its resistance to
roll-over, either during the development of
said automobile or subsequent to the initial
production of said automobiles.
(R. 124.)
The second and third sets of interrogatories were substantially similar to the first set of interrogatories.

While many

of the questions did seek disclosure of development tests, the
interrogatories also clearly sought disclosure of all subsequent
tests of the handling characteristics of the Commando.
ii.

The
Subject
Films
Were
Produced
AMC/Jeepfs Agents and Were Subject
Discovery.

by
to

The second excuse offered by AMC/Jeep for its apparently
deliberate decision to not disclose the films prior to trial was
that the films were not produced by AMC/Jeep, but rather by its
attorneys or experts hired by its attorneys.
without

merit.

A

party

must,

in response

This excuse is
to

a

discovery

request, disclose facts or documents in the attorney's possession even if they have not been transmitted to the party itself.
See Hawes Firearms Co. v. Edwards, 634 P.2d 377, 379 n.4 (Alaska
1981).

The privilege further does not apply to exhibits that

will be offered at trial.
Discovery § 67 (1983).

23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions and

AMC/Jeep!s assertion of such an excuse
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merely indicates the general posture it took towards discovery
in this case.
iii. The Interrogatories Encompassed Testing of
Vehicles Similar to the Commando.
The third excuse offered by AMC/Jeep in support of its
nondisclosure of the films, and the one relied upon by the
majority opinion, was that the interrogatories sought disclosure
of tests on Commandos, whereas the films were tests of other
vehicles.

The majority's ruling was based on their reading of

the first three sets of interrogatories.

Whatever may have been

the scope of the first three sets of interrogatories, the films
were clearly within the scope of the fourth set of interrogatories.

Those interrogatories sought disclosure of the names of

AMC/Jeepfs

expert

witnesses* and

sought

the

following

with

respect to each such expert:
The name or description of the products,
objects, documents, records, memoranda,
correspondence, or any other tangible form
of documentation, recordation or communication which was analyzed or examined.
(R. 908.)
The

interrogatories

further

sought

the

following

respect to each such expert:
Identify, with specificity, each and every
document, memoranda, correspondence, record,
or other tangible form of documentation,
recordation, or communication which have
been submitted to, or made available to him
or her for purposes of forming an opinion
relative to the issues which have been
raised in a complaint filed in this action .
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with

(R. 910.)
The subject films were clearly a document or recordation
which had been made available to Mr. Heitzman and analyzed by
him.

There can be no question that the films were within the

scope of this interrogatory.2

AMC/Jeep's only response was to

file an objection asserting that because the court had previously ordered the parties to exchange names of expert witnesses,
AMC/Jeep had no obligation to submit any further information
concerning those experts.

(R. 997-99.)

The order referred to

(R. 949-50), however, in no way intimates that discovery was
limited

to only the names of the expert witnesses.

There

specifically is no basis in the record to conclude that AMC/Jeep
was not under an obligation to identify its exhibits prior to
the middle of trial.
The subject films were, moreover, within the scope of the
first three sets of interrogatories.
whether

the

interrogatories

may

The critical issue is

fairly

be

read

as

seeking

disclosure of tests on non-Commando vehicles, but which related
to the handling characteristics of the Commando.

The trial

court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the films
were within the scope of the interrogatories.

"Neither ques-

tions nor their answers should be interpreted with excessive
rigidity or technicality, but a rule of reason should be applied

2

Defendant Larry Anderson also specifically requested
disclosure of all exhibits which AMC/Jeep intended to submit at
trial and AMC/Jeep failed to respond to the interrogatories.
(R. 806-08.)
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as to both."

Pillincr v. General Motors Corporation, 45 F.R.D.

366, 369 (D. Utah 1968) .

This rule was illustrated in Hawes

Firearms Co. v. Edwards, 634 P. 2d 377

(Alaska

1981).

The

defendants in that case responded negatively to an interrogatory
which inquired:

"Please state whether their is any insurance,

either liability or otherwise, available to the Defendants to
cover this cause of action."

63 4 P.2d at 3 79.

The defendants

negative answer was probably technically correct.

The manufac-

turer of the product in question in that case, however, had
agreed to indemnify the defendant and an insurance company had
insured

the

indemnity

agreement.

The Alaska

Supreme Court

affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the defendant had
willfully failed to comply with discovery and affirmed the order
striking the defendant's answer.
A similar result was reached in United Nuclear Corp. v.
General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231 (1980).

One of

the interrogatories in question in that case sought discovery of
certain information from the defendants, but failed to specifically state that it also sought the information from a cartel of
which the defendant was a member.
disclose
Based

the

on that

requested
and

information

other discovery

The defendant failed to
relating

the cartel.

abuses, the trial

entered default judgment against the defendant.
Supreme Court affirmed.

to

The New Mexico

The Court stated as follows:

In construing Rules 33 and 34, we must begin
with the notion that discovery is designed to
"make a trial less a game of blindman's buff and
more a fair contest with the basic issues and
31
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facts disclosed to the fullest practicable
extent.11 United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356
U.S. 677, 682, 78 S.Ct. 983, 986-87, 2 L.Ed.2d
1077 (1958) (citation omitted). In light of that
policy, Rules 53 and 34 must be liberally
construed in order to ensure that a litigant's
right to discovery is "broad and flexible."
[citations omitted.]
629 P.2d at 245-46.
Addressing

the

specific

interrogatory

in

question, the

Court held as follows:
The second of the excuses—the failure
of the complaint or interrogatories to
explicitly or implicitly mention the cartel
.-.. is immaterial. United's right to information did not turn upon its discovery of a
magic formula.
629 P.2d at 290.
The interrogatories in the instant case, fairly read in
light of the

foregoing principals, inquired

as to any test

performed by AMC/Jeep, or its agents or attorneys, at any time,
which

evaluated

or would

be used

at trial to evaluate the

handling characteristics of the Jeep Commando.

The interroga-

tories were not limited to "tests of the Commando," but rather
encompassed

tests

of

the

handling

characteristics

of

the

Commando.
For example, interrogatory

no. 3 6 of the

first set of

interrogatories inquired as to whether "American Motors Corporation has tested for or otherwise evaluated the effect of the
track width of the Jeep Commando automobile on its resistance to
roll-over . . . ."

(R. 124, copy attached at Appendix "B".)

The track width of the Commando was identical to the track width
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of the CJ-5 which was shown in the Heitzman films,

(R. 2962.)

The Heitzman film constituted a test of the effect of a track
width of the Jeep Commando on its resistance to roll-over and
was offered at trial as such.

The trial court did not abuse its

discretion in determining that the test was within the scope of
the interrogatories.
The majority opinion apparently asserts, however, that the
defendants had no advance notice of a comparison between the
wheel bases of the CJ-5 and the Commando, and that reading the
interrogatory to include the Heitzman film would be unfair.3

In

overturning the trial court on this issue, this Court stated:
The dissenting opinion would have defendants
divine the scope of the requests by a trial
court ruling
on the admissibility
of
evidence which came much later. This burden
cannot fairly be placed on them.
Whitehead, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30.
Contrary to this Court's opinion, the defendants were not
required to divine that filmed testing of CJ-5's, which was the
subject of Exhibit 95, was going to be an issue at trial and
within

the

scope of discovery.

Plaintiff had

3

specifically

It is important to remember that the Heitzman films were,
in any event, within the scope of the fourth set of interrogatories and Larry Anderson's interrogatories.
AMC/Jeep understood the films to be within the scope of those interrogatories.
In discussing the Heitzman films, Mr. Mandlebaum, AMC/Jeep's
attorney, stated that "[i]t wasn't requested until interrogatories, your honor." (R. 3343.) This implicit acknowledgement
that disclosure of the films had been requested, coupled with
Jeep's nondisclosure until the middle of trial, constitutes an
independent basis for the trial court's exclusion of the films.
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advised defendants of his intention to use such filmed testing
as shown below in this subpoint.
In addition, even if defendants could have claimed ignorance at the early stages of this lawsuit, plaintiff submitted
an additional set of interrogatories after the set discussed in
the majority opinion.

As is shown above at page 2 6 of this

Brief, the excluded films were clearly within the scope of at
least the fourth set of interrogatories, yet AMC/Jeep did not
disclose the films.

Plaintiff's Motion in Limine filed ap-

proximately two weeks before trial addressed this deficiency.
Even

at

the hearing

on the motion

the

defendants

did

not

disclose the film, presumably on the theory that it was the work
product of counsel, and therefore immune from the order of the
court.

The judge took the motion under advisement and said he

would rule as the evidence was offered.

No disclosure was made

by the defendants until the film was marked and offered.
The following excerpts from the deposition of plaintiff's
expert, Robert Anderson, taken in July, 1983, illustrate that
defendants knew that filmed testing of CJ-5's and CJ-7fs was
going to be an issue at trial:
Q:
(By Mr. Jensen) Now, you say it's
susceptible to overturn?
A:

Yes.

Q:
And you say that's a defect in
this vehicle?
A:

Yes.

Q:
Have
Commando?

you

ever

overturned
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a

A:
on?

Not a Commando, no.

Q:
Then what do you base that opinion
What experience do you have?

A:
I base that on the testing that
I've done of similar vehicles.
Q:

What similar vehicles?

A:
The CJ 5 and the CJ 7 are similar
vehicles. The basic difference between the
CJ 5 and the CJ 7 and the Commando, is the
wheel base.
The center of gravity is
basically the same, and the width of the
vehicle is basically the same.
And those
are the two parameters that are most
important in governing the overturn of the
vehicle.
Q:
So you are saying that the CJ 5
and 7 is similar to a CJ 6?
A:

The Commando, yes.

(R. 1750 at pp. 18-19.)
*

*

*

Q:
[By Mr. Jensen]
with you in these tests?

Who participated

A:
They were done by me.
Dynamic
Science supported me.
They furnished a
driver and photographer and the test track.
And I also had some help measuring the
center of gravity on some of these vehicles,
from a guy by the name of Morrie Shaw. But
I basically did all the tests.
Q:

These are documented in a film?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Is that available for us to look

at!
A:
Well, the testing was funded by an
attorney in Reno, Nevada.
Q:

What's his name?
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A:
Peter Chase Neumann.
possession of all the films.

And he has

Q:
And those eight vehicles, one of
them was a CJ 7, 1980?
A:

Yes.

(R. 1750 at pp. 21-22.)
*

*

*

Q:
(BY MR. JENSEN)
So what conclusions did you draw from that test, with
respect to the 1972 Commando that's involved
in this case?
A:
Well, that has basically the same
height-to-width ratio as the CJ 5 and CJ 7.
Therefore, it has a similar susceptibility
to overturn in a steering maneuver as the CJ
5 and the CJ 7.
(R. 1750 at p. 26.)
It is clear from the record that AMC/Jeep knew well in
advance of trial that a significant aspect of their defense
would involve rebuttal to plaintiff's evidence concerning the
comparability of CJ-5 testing.
issues,

AMC/Jeep

elected

to

Despite full knowledge of the
withhold

from

plaintiff

their

evidence concerning CJ-5 testing and testing of other vehicles
for comparison of rollover susceptibility.
The defendants were not surprised, rather they were guilty
of the worst kind of discovery abuse.

This Court's suggestion

that defendants were burdened by the trial court with a duty of
divination is not substantiated anywhere in the record.
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iv.

AMC/Jeepfs
Heitzman

disclose

final

excuse

for

failing

to

disclose

films was that they were work product.

respectfully
product.

The Claim of "Work Product" was not a Valid
Excuse for Failing to Disclose the Heitzman
Films.

asserts

that

the

films

clearly

the

Whitehead

were

not

work

Even if they were, AMC/Jeep still had a duty to
their

existence.

Pilling

v.

General

Corporation, 45 F.R.D. 366, 369-70 (D. Utah 1968).

Motors

Particularly

with matter which will be introduced as exhibits at trial, a
party has a duty to at least disclose the existence of the
exhibits and enough of the contents so that the opposing party
can determine

if the claim

of work product

is legitimate.

AMC/Jeep!s failure to do so constituted an abuse of discovery
which warranted the sanction imposed by the trial court.
D.

Exclusion Of The Heitzman Film On Non-Jeep Rollovers
Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion.

The second Heitzman

film was not admitted

for all the

reasons referred to above concerning discovery and because it
was determined to be irrelevant.

A considered evaluation of the

relevancy of that film cannot be made because the film is not
part of a record on appeal.

While the film is not in the

record, it is counsel's recollection that the second film was
made by Ford Motor Company and showed Ford automobiles, with
facsimiles (dummies) of human bodies, being driven off ramps so
as to turn over.

There was simply no relevance to the film

except to show that under laboratory conditions other passenger
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car vehicles, not utility vehicles, could be turned over. (R.
3353.)
The trial court had at least three clear bases for excluding the films:

(1) discovery abuse, including the failure

to respond to plaintiff's third set of interrogatories, which
was not considered by this Court, (2) an improper claim of work
product, and the failure to disclose that claim prior to trial
and (3) irrelevancy of the second film.

Viewed in the context

of the entire case, each of the trial court's rulings was within
the permissible scope of discretion, and should be affirmed.
E.

Refusal to Admit Exhibit
Board) Was Not Error.

130

(Illustrative

Story

AMC/Jeep through Dr. Charles Warner offered and the court
received 34 exhibits.

Only two exhibits prepared by Dr. Warner

were excluded and a basis for a defense claim of error.

Exhibit

174, a film made on a Saturday during a weekend recess in the
middle of Warner's testimony, was found inadmissible by this
Court because it had no probative value and had been barred by
the ruling of Judge Sorenson which excluded this evidence for
failure to respond to discovery.
by the trial

The only other exhibit refused

court was Exhibit

13 0.

The entire testimony

regarding this exhibit is set forth as follows:
Q.
130 is.

All Right.

I ask you what Exhibit

A.
130 is a story board, notes that I
have
prepared
that
show
the
various
measurements and the other indications of
damage on this vehicle.
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MR. JENSEN:
Honor.

We

offer

MR. HOWARD:
witness?

May

I

THE COURT:

130,

voir

Your

dire

the

Yes, you may.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. HOWARD:
Q.
Dr. Warner, didn't you say as one
of the last remarks that you made on Friday
evening, that you were not sure there was
any—let me restate it.
You said two
things.
One, that you did not think the
Jeep was defective at the time of the
accident.
A.
At the time it left the hands of
the manufacturer I said.
Q.
And is it not true, that you also
said that at the time of the accident you're
not sure there was any defect in the Jeep?
A.
No defect that I could see that
necessarily caused the accident.
Q.
said.
A.

Yes.

That's what I thought you

That's right.

MR. HOWARD:

Okay.

MR. JENSEN:

Offer 130, your Honor.

MR. HOWARD: My objection, Your Honor,
is that we concede that there had been an
accident in the Jeep, and there'd been some
repairs. But unless there's a defect that
caused the accident, it's irrelevant and
immaterial. No one contends that there's a
substantial
modification
or
substantial
change in the condition of the vehicle that
caused the accident. And therefore, all of
this data concerning body putty, things of
that sort, that normally go into a vehicle
after a repair, isn't material.
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MR. JENSEN:
Offer it, Your Honor.
Stand on the record.
We've gone into the
whole explanation of the condition.
THE COURT:

Sustain the objection.

(R. 3812-14)
The record states that Exhibit 130 was a series of Dr.
Warner's notes.

No further explanation was given.

The failure

to produce this exhibit violated the discovery rulings of the
trial court, and was further inadmissible for lack of adequate
foundation and probative value.

A simple reading of the above

colloquy

that

clearly

demonstrates

the

exhibit,

even

if

admissible, was not substantial evidence whose refusal would be
prejudicial.
Furthermore the transcript does not adequately explain what
Dr. Warner meant by a "story board" and the exhibit itself was
not seen or reviewed by this Court or furnished by AMC/Jeep to
this Court.

It appears that the exhibit was merely illustrative

of testimony which had been previously

admitted.

It seems

impossible for the majority of the Court to have reached its
conclusion

regarding

the

admissibility

without viewing the exhibit.

of

this

Exhibit

130

It was the defendants1 burden to

designate that exhibit as part of the record on appeal and to
have it presented to this Court.

It was error for this Court to

reverse based on the exclusion of an exhibit the relevance of
which cannot be determined from the record.
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POINT III
THE MAJORITY OPINION IMPROPERLY ACCUMULATES
INSUBSTANTIAL AND NONPREJUDICIAL ERROR.
The majority opinion in effect adopts a "cumulative error
doctrine" and overrules, sub silentio, prior decisions of this
Court.

The majority opinion, after analyzing the few isolated

errors which AMC/Jeep was able to claim existed in the record of
the three-week trial, states as follows:
In the instant case, the trial court erroneously " excluded evidence offered by
defendants. That evidence was necessary to
rebut the assertions that plaintiffs made to
establish
liability.
This error was
compounded by unduly restricting the scope
of defendants1 cross-examination. Given the
conflicting testimony presented on this key
issue, we cannot say that the substantial
rights of defendants were not affected by
the combined effects of the erroneous
exclusion of the evidence and the limitation
of cross-examination. While no one error by
itself
perhaps
mandates
reversal, the
cumulative effect of the several errors
undermines our confidence that defendants
were able to present to the jury their
theory of the case and that a fair trial was
had.
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27,
32 (Feb. 2, 1989)(emphasis added).
The Court, by such language, has created a new category of
error somewhere between "prejudicial" and "non-prejudicial"
which

a single

"nearly

prejudicial" error

in

does not mandate

reversal, but four "nearly prejudicial" errors do.

It is not

clear, under this new standard, whether one gauges the cumulative effect by the length of the trial, the timing of the error
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in regard to other errors, or by some other criteria, e.g., one
non-prejudicial error per 1000 pages of transcript.
This Court has previously held that error, in order to
warrant reversal, must be "substantial and prejudicial."
v. Bancrart, 525 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1974).

Lamb

See also State v.

Miller, 727 P.2d 203 (Utah 1986); State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603
(Utah 1985) ; Terry v. Zion's Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d
314 (Utah 1979).

Any single "substantial and prejudicial" error

is alone sufficient to necessitate reversal.

If, however, an

error is not "substantial and prejudicial," it does not justify
reversal.
The same principle was expressed in a civil case by an Ohio
appellate court as follows:
It is argued that even though this
court should find that no single error
assigned was sufficiently prejudicial to
justify a reversal of the judgment, yet the
accumulative effect of all of the errors set
out, when taken together, requires this
court to hold that the plaintiff was not
afforded a fair trial and that for that
reason, the judgment should be reversed and
a new trial granted. This claim is without
any legal foundation whatever.
Any error
shown upon the record must stand or fall on
its own merits and is not aided by the
accumulative effect of other claims of
error.
Nicholas v. Yellow Cab Co. , 116 Ohio App. 402, 180 N.E.2d 279,
286

(1962)(emphasis

added).

See

also

Richlin

v.

Amusement Co. , 113 Ohio App- 99, 170 N.E.2d 505, 508

Gooding
(1960),

appeal dismissed, 172 Ohio St. 342, 175 N.E.2d 516 (1961); Hess

42

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Oil & Chemical Corp. v. Nash, 226 Ga. 706, 177 S.E.2d 70, 72-73
(1970).
The logic for this rule is clear.
still equals zero.

Zero plus zero plus zero

The need for the rule is also clear, as was

stated in a prior decision of this Court:
This court has previously stated that in any
lawsuit of several days duration counsel can
usually find matters upon which he may claim
error, but this court will not reverse on
mere error but only if it be substantial and
prejudicial to the extent that there is a
reasonable likelihood that unfairness or
injustice has resulted.
Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974).
Counsel for Whitehead are aware of only two prior Utah
cases which have applied any type of cumulative error doctrine.
Ivie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5, 336 P.2d 781 (1959); State v.
St.

Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d

respectfully
support

submits

that

for the cumulative

neither

323

of

(1955).

those

error rationale

cases

Plaintiff
provides

of the majority

opinion in this case.
State v. St. Clair was an appeal from a conviction of first
degree murder and a sentence of death.

As stated in the opinion

itself, the appellate court had a heightened duty of scrutiny
due to the severity of the penalty imposed.

282 P. 2d at 332.

That circumstance is not present in this civil case.

St. Clair

has never been cited by any court as support for a cumulative
error doctrine.
Ivie v. Richardson can best be explained by this Court's
own subsequent citations to that opinion.

The portion of the
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opinion quoted by AMC/Jeep has been frequently cited by the Utah
Supreme

Court, but

doctrine.

never

as

supporting

a

cumulative

error

i

For example, Ivie was cited in State v. Geurts, 11

Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12, 16 (1961), as support for the statement that an error is not reversible "unless it is of such

i

consequence that it is may fairly be supposed that it had a
substantial effect upon the trial in that there is a reasonable
likelihood that a different result would have obtained, absent
such error."
1005

i

In Eager v. Willis, 17 Utah 2d 314, 410 P.2d 1003,

(1966) , Ivie was

cited

to

support

the

statement

that

"[r]eversal of a judgment is justified only when there is some

i

error of such a substantial nature that there is a likelihood
that the result would have been different in its absence."
in addition, an analysis of Ivie itself demonstrates that
the errors

identified

substantial

and

regarding

in that

prejudicial.

contributory

case were
Two

each

of the jury

negligence, the primary

case, were conflicting with each other.

i

independently
instructions
issue

in the

1

Another jury instruc-

tion contained an erroneous statement of law.

The errors were

clearly prejudicial.

1

Even the best trial judges are bound to make some errors.
The longer the trial, the greater the number of errors.

If the

"cumulative error" logic of the majority opinion is allowed to
stand, a reversal can be assured for any protracted trial.
would cripple the judicial process.

'

This

The trial judge, who is on

the front line and intimately familiar with the trial, must be
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{

granted a wide latitude of discretion in evidentiary rulings.
This is especially true for long trials.
This Court correctly concluded that none of the errors by
itself justified reversal.

Because no single error was substan-

tial or prejudicial, the judgment of the trial court in this
case should be affirmed.
POINT IV
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED
FOR A NEW TRIAL ON LIABILITY ONLY, AND
THE DAMAGE AWARD SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Nowhere among

its numerous and comprehensive

claims of

error does AMC/Jeep challenge the jury's verdict as to the
amount necessary to compensate Stephen Whitehead for his severe
and tragic injuries.
little.

The jury verdict is, if anything, too

Appellee has established herein that the judgment of

the trial court should be affirmed in its entirety.
arguendo, that this Court does not modify

Assuming,

its decision and

affirm the trial court, any new trial should be limited to the
issue of liability only, and the judgment on damages should be
held

in

abeyance

and

execution

thereon

stayed

pending

the

outcome of the new trial.
This

Court

has

previously

acknowledged

the

prejudicial

effect of a grant of a new trial:
A second trial is not without its costs
in terms of scarce litigant and judicial
resources and the possible unavailability of
witnesses or the erosion of their memories.
Consequently, the trial judge's prerogative
to grant a new trial on an evidentiary basis
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under Rule 59(a)(6) should be exercised with
forbearance.
Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982).
A corollary to this rule is that a new trial should not be
ordered on issues as to which there was no error:
i

The guiding principle is that although a
verdict ought not to stand which is tainted
with illegality, there ought to be- but one
fair trial upon any issue, and that parties
ought not to be compelled to try anew a
question once disposed of by a decision
against which no illegality can be shown.
58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial § 25 (1971).
This Court has stated that a new trial as to liability only

<

would be proper unless the liability and damage issues are "so
intermingled that fairness to both parties requires retrial on
both."

Groen v. Tri-O-Inc., 667 P.2d 598, 607 n.ll (Utah 1983).

See also Annot., Grant of new trial on issue of liability alone,
without retrial of issue of damages, 34 A.L.R.2d 988 (1954).
There

is no question that the issues of liability and
i

damages were not intermingled in this case.

Prior to the trial,

plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine to Bifurcate Testimony (R.
1053), which sought to bifurcate the testimony on liability from
that on damages.

The defendants

did not

file any written

response to the motion, but did argue against the motion.

The

logical basis or legal authority for the defendants1 opposition
is not clear from the record.

(R. 1671, 4820.)

After consider-

ing all of the arguments, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to bifurcate the testimony on liability from that
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on damages.

The defendants have not questioned the propriety of

that ruling.
In addition to affirming the jury verdict as to the amount
of Stephen Whitehead's damages, this Court should also specifically hold that interest will continue to accrue on that damage
award.

Utah

has

long

recognized

that

a party

who

delays

compensating an injured person should pay interest to compensate
for the delay:
Interest by way of damages, or moratory
interest, as it is sometimes called, is
interest allowed in actions for breach of
contract or in actions for tort as damages,
for the unlawful detention of money found to
be due.
It depends not upon any express
contractual obligation to pay interest, but
upon the theory that the party breaching the
contract or committing the tort became bound
at the time of the breach to make reparation; and for this delay in making such
reparation, the injured party is entitled to
such interest, as will recompense him
therefor.
Farnworth

v.

Jensen,

117

Utah

494,

217

P.2d

571,

575>

(1950)(quoting 30 Am. Jur. Damages § 2 ) .
Although prejudgment interest is generally not allowed on
the general damage portion of a personal

injury award, the

rationale for this rule is that the debt is unliquidated.
Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 667 (1988) .

22

Interest is allowed "where

the loss is fixed as of a particular time and the amount of the
loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy.11

Jorgensen

v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah 1983).
Where the amount of Stephen Whitehead's loss has been fixed
by a jury, no reason exists to deny him interest on that entire
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sum during the time that defendants have the use of that money.
This Court should so hold.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
The rules of this Court provide that the Court has discretion to schedule additional oral arguments in this case.
Utah Sup. Ct. 35(c).

R.

Plaintiff respectfully submits that this

is an appropriate case to rehear oral arguments.
Although the Court has power in some cases to decide cases
on

the

briefs

without

receiving

oral

arguments,

plaintiff

respectfully urges the Court to not do so in this case.

Oral

argument is important, particularly where several issues are
involved.

Numerous

importance

of

oral

studies have
argument.

considered

Several

the effect and

of the

studies were

summarized by the California Supreme Court as follows:
Oral argument provides the only opportunity for a
dialogue between the litigant and the bench. As
result, "it promotes understanding in ways that
cannot be matched by written communication.If
[Citation.] For example, in complex cases, oral
argument "provides a fluid and rapidly moving
method of getting at essential issues. [Citation.]
In the words of one judge, tf 'Mistakes,
errors, fallacies and flaws elude us in spite of
ourselves unless the case is pounded and hammered
at the Bar. f ff [Citation.]
Moles v. Regents of the University of California, 32 Cal. 3d
867, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 654 P.2d 740, 743-44 (1982) (emphasis
added).
In

another

study,

two

federal

appellate

court

judges

evaluated the effects of oral argument on their own decisions,
and stated as follows:
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As caseloads increase, oral argument
becomes even more important to decision
making.
All too often, with the time
pressures that accompany heavy work loads,
essential elements of a case are overlooked
in a hurried reading and analysis of the
briefs.
In many cases, effective oral
argument thus lessens the likelihood of an
erroneous decision.
Bright and Arnold, Oral Argument?

It May Be Crucial!, 70 A.B.A.

J. 68, 69 (Sept. 1984).
The trial in this case took two and one-half weeks, and the
record is over 5,000 pages.

In a case such as this, oral

arguments would be helpful to allow the litigants an opportunity
to clarify any questions the Court might have.
CONCLUSION
This case was tried before one of the State's most capable
trial

judges.

deference
rulings.

to

The majority
the

trial

opinion

court's

failed

discretion

to give proper
in

evidentiary

In doing so, this Court relied on evidence which was

not part of the record, and which did not relate to a critical
aspect of plaintiff's case.

The judgment of the trial court

should be affirmed.
As an alternative, and only as an alternative, this case
should be remanded for a new trial on the issue of liability
only.
DATED this

4L'^

day of August, 1989.

(CKSON HOWARD, f o r :
(/HOW
I0WARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN

Attorneys for Appellee
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ration and Jeep Corporation (AMC/Jeep)
appeal a judgment awarded plaintiff Stephen
Whitehead on a products liability-claim.
On October 16, 1979, Deborah Whitehead
was driving south on 1-15 near Orem, Utah,
in a 1972 Jeep Commando that she had borrowed from her father. Her husband, Stephen,
was riding in the passenger seat. Defendant
Larry Anderson was returning home from
work in his automobile, a short distance
behind the Whiteheads. The Oldsmobile
station wagon he was driving was traveling
approximately fifteen miles per hour faster
than the Commando. The Oldsmobile struck
the Commando on the left rear corner; the
Commando went out of control and rolled.
Stephen Whitehead suffered a spinal injury
and was rendered a paraplegic.
Plaintiffs Deborah and Stephen Whitehead
WE CONCUR:
filed their original complaint on November 21,
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
1979, naming Anderson as defendant. The
Christine M. Durham, Justice
complaint was later amended, adding AndeMichael D. Zimmerman, Justice
rson's employer, Variable Annuity Life InsStewart, Justice, concurs in the result.
urance Company,1 and AMC and Jeep as
defendants.
1. AMC/Jeep. was held liable for the remaining 70
During the nearly four years between the
percent because of the negligent design of the 1972 filing of the original complaint and the begiJeep Commando in which plaintiffs were riding.
AMC/Jeep has filed a separate appeal, No. 19695, nning of trial, the parties engaged in extensive
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, which we also decide today. discovery. Plaintiffs propounded three sets of
interrogatories to AMC/Jeep. Their failure to
timely answer the interrogatories brought
motions by plaintiffs to compel discovery.
%
AMC/Jeep's
answers, when received, pro*'•••
."'"•""••' C i t e a s ' l '• '"'.
mpted a motion to strike as unresponsive and
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 27
additional motions to compel discovery by
IN THE SUPREME COURT
plaintiffs. A hearing on those motions was
held on October 29, 1982, where Judge SoreOF THE STATE OF UTAH
nsen2 went through the interrogatories and
answers. He modified some of the questions,
Stephen WHITEHEAD and Deborah
gave orders for supplemental answers to be
Whitehead,
given, and stated that if the answers stood as
Plaintiffs and Appellee,
given, he would sustain objections to evidence
v.
not conforming with the answers. Plaintiffs
AMERICAN MOTORS SALES
orally asked for sanctions against AMC/Jeep
CORPORATION and Jeep Corporation,
Larry Anderson, Variable Annuity Life
for failure to cooperate in discovery. While no
Insurance Company,
formal motion was made and no order for
sanctions was ever issued, plaintiffs did file a
Defendants and Appellants.
motion in limine after the supplemental
No. 19695
answers were filed seeking to prohibit AMC/
Jeep from introducing evidence pertaining to
FILED: February 2, 1989
the subjects of certain interrogatories. The
FOURTH DISTRICT
court reserved ruling on the motion until the
Honorable J. Robert Bullock
evidence was offered.
Plaintiffs also filed a motion in limine on
ATTORNEYS:.
October
7, 1983, regarding the admissibility of
C. Keith Rooker, Patricia W. Christensen,
a film produced by Dynamic Science that
Thomas B. Green, Salt Lake City, for
showed Jeep CJ-5s rolling over in staged
Appellants
tests. Upon a prescreeninng of the film and
Jackson Howard, Richard B. Johnson, Provo, over AMC/Jeep's objection, the judge ruled
that the film was admissible. Plaintiffs also
for Appellee
moved to exclude all evidence as to the availHOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
ability and their nonuse of seat belts. After
Defendants American Motors Sales Corpo- reviewing memoranda of the parties and proffers of proof, the court barred references to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J.
Reuben
Clark Law
BYU.
the
availability
orSchool,
nonuse
of seat belts.

was merely incidental that he chose to make
them from his home.
We hold that the "coming and going rule" is
applicable in cases involving third-party
negligence claims. Where a third party is
seeking to hold an employer vicariously liable,
the employee must be in the "course and scope
of his employment," that is, he must be acting
to benefit his employer and subject to his
control. The trial court erred in ruling that
Anderson was in the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the accident as a
matter of law. The order directing a verdict in
favor of plaintiffs and Anderson is reversed,
and the case is remanded to enter judgment in
favor of VALIC in accordance with the jury
verdict.

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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American Motors Sales Corporation filed its
answer to the complaint in September 1983, j
over three years after being named in the
amended complaint and just one month prior i
to the trial. It raised Utah Code Ann. §78- I
15-3(1) (1987) as a defense. This statute bars
the bringing of a products liability action
"more than six years after the date of initial
purchase for use or consumption." Jeep Corporation moved to amend its answer to also
include this defense; the motion was denied.
Trial commenced on October 19, 1983, and
continued for three weeks. The jury determined that AMC and Jeep were negligent in the
design of the vehicle and awarded damages to
Stephen Whitehead. AMC and Jeep appeal,
raising several issues which we will separately
consider.
I.
Defendants contend that they should have
been allowed to interpose a defense based on
Utah Code Ann. §78-15-3 (1987), which
provides that product liability actions are
barred if brought "more than six years after
the initial purchase." In Berry ex rel Berry v.
Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), we
held that statute to be unconstitutional; therefore, defendants' point is moot.
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steering and handling characteristics than the
Commando. Defendant also objected on
grounds that the tests were not substantially
similar to the accident conditions. The tests
were "J turns" where 588 degrees of steering
were suddenly input while a constant vehicle
speed was maintained. The test vehicles had
also been "specially prepared" to accentuate
the rollovers depicted in the films. The requirement of "substantial similarity of conditions" does not require absolute identity;
however, they must "be so nearly the same in
substantial particulars as to afford a fair
comparison in respect to the particular issue to
which the test is directed/ Illinois Central
GulfR.R. v. Ishee, 317 So. 2d 923, 926 (Miss.
1975) (emphasis added). The films here were
offered to show the handling characteristics of
the Jeep Commando. Plaintiffs' experts testified at length that the handling characteristics
of the CJ-5s shown in the tests and the
Commando were substantially similar. Defendants by cross-examination and presentation of their own evidence endeavored to bring
out the differences between the test and the
accident and between the vehicle tested and
the vehicle in question.
Given our .standard of review of the admissibility of evidence at trial, we cannot clearly
say that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting ,. plaintiffs' films in light of the
foundation laid'by their experts. As the trial
court stated in admitting the films, any differences between the tests and the accident here
would go to the weight the jury would give the
evidence.* Jones v. Stemco Mfg. Co., 624 P.2d
1044, 1046 (Okla. 1981); see Lopez v. Allen,
96 Idaho 866, 871, 538 P.2d 1170, 1175
(1975).
~.

DL
Defendants contend that the court erred in
admitting plaintiffs' films of Jeep CJ-5s. In
reviewing questions of admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given^ to the trial
court's advantageous position;* thus, that
court's rulings regarding admissibility will not
be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.
Bullock v. Ungrichu 538 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah
1975); Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750
F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Collins v.
m.
B.F. Goodrich Co., 558 F.2d 908 (8th Cir.
Defendants next contend that the trial court
1977).
erred in limiting their cross-examination of
The criteria for establishing the admissibility
plaintiffs' expert witnesses. While unduly
of crash test films, such as those in issue here,
harsh limitation of a key expert witness can
'are that the data be relevant, that the tests be
amount to prejudicial error, the proper scope
conducted under conditions substantially
of cross-examination is within the sound
similar to those of the actual occurrence, and
discretion of the trial court and should not be
that its presentation not consume undue
disturbed absent a showing of abuse. State v.
amounts of time, not confuse the issues, and
Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978); Stare v.
not mislead the jury. Endicott v. Nissan
Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804
Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 141 Cal.
(1972); State v. Fox, 22 Utah 2d 211, 450 P.2d
Rptr. 95 (1977); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of
987
(1969); N.V. Maatschappij v. A.O. Smith
America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109 Cal.
Corp.,
590 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 1978). In
Rptr. 110 (1973); Jackson v. Fletcher, 647
Chrysler
Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123
F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1981); Renfro Hosiery
Mills Co. v. United Cash Register Co., 552 (Wyo. 1978), the Wyoming court held that it
F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1977); see Weaver v. Ford was prejudical error to refuse to allow crossMotor Co., 382 F. Supp. 1068 (E.D. Pa. examination regarding a critical aspect of
1974), afrd, 515 F.2d 506, 507 (3d Cir. 1975) j plaintiffs proof. There the court stated:
Having offered his expert opinion,
(without published opinion); see also Collins
the
witness exposes himself to intv. B.F. Goodrich, 558 F.2d at 910.
errogation which ordinarily would
Defendants objected to admission of tests of
have no place in the crossCJ-5s on the basis that the CJ-5 has a 20examination
of a factual witness,
Digitized by
the Howard W.giving
Hunter Law
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
inch shorter
wheelbase,
it Library,
different
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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but the expert exposes himself to
the most searching kind of investigation into his qualifications, the
extent of his knowledge and the
reasons for his opinion, including
the facts and other matters upon
which it is based.
Id. at 1133.
Defendants contend that there were several
instances where the trial court's limiting of
cross-examination prevented them from
examining the basis of opinions offered by
plaintiffs' experts. In his direct testimony,
-plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Anderson, testified that
the Jeep Commando was defective because its
track width was narrow and its center of
gravity high, making it easily susceptible to
rollovers. He also testified concerning the
handling characteristics of Blazers, Chevy
C h e v e t t e s , and C J - 7 s . On c r o s s examination, he was asked:
Q: Are there other vehicles that
1
have the same track width?
Mr. Howard [plaintiffs' counsel]:
Object. Repetitious and irrelevant.
Court: Sustained on. the grounds
;_..-' it's irrelevant.
£ • Q: Are there other vehicles that
^
have about the same center of
^
gravity? / * _
:
';;• Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrel"~ v - evant.
.•'" J .:- . , \ . ,•''•• .'*-1
c
"5* Court: Sustained!
Q: If you drive a three-quarterton pickup, is it the same, as driving
a Honda Accord; handling, steering?
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrelevant.
Court: Sustained.
Q: ... [T]ake another vehicle that
has wider track width, and lower
center of gravity, can it be rolled on
;:
a level surface with driver [steering]
?i '... input?
«*
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's irrel- .
?tstr. evant.
i^'h-...
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contrary to the thesis of the dissenting
opinion, is not a utility vehicle. Defendant
should have been allowed to probe the comparisons Anderson made.
In testifying for plaintiff, Mr. Noettl,
another expert witness, testified: "It was very
difficult to turn a passenger car over." On
cross-examination, he was asked the basis of
this opinion.
Q: What experience have you had
in trying to rollover [sic] a passe- '
nger vehicle?
Mr. Johnson: Object on the basis
of relevancy.
Court: I don't want to get into
testing all other kinds of vehicles,
because we've got enough problems
with the one. So, I'm going to
sustain the objection.
Contrary to the statement in the dissenting
opinion, it is clear that by inquiring as to his
experience, defendants were attempting to
probe the expert's credibility and the foundation for his testimony that it is difficult to
roll a passenger car.
On recross-examination, Mr. Noettl was
also asked:
Q: I think we were talking about
what you would expect to happen
to the Commando or any other
vehicle that's hit under the circumstances you have been describing.
A: Yes.
Q: And do you feel that any
vehicle would come out of that situation unscathed, basically?
Plaintiffs objection to this question was also
sustained.
An assertion or opinion given on direct
testimony that bears on a key issue in the case
is a proper subject of cross-examination.
While the trial court's attempt to avoid confusion of the issues and a long and cumbersome trial is understandable, defendants were
entitled to conduct cross-examination into
the basis of the opinions offered by plaintiffs'
expert witnesses and to probe the comparisons
they had made on direct examination. Here defendants were repeatedly cut off
during their attempts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts. The numerous objections of
plaintiffs' counsel, many of which were improperly sustained, prevented defendants from
probing the basis of opinions given by plaintiffs' experts on comparisons they had made
in their direct examination. As a result, the
issues were presented to the jury without the
added light that thorough cross-examination
sheds. We find therefore that the trial, court
erred in limiting defendants' crossexamination of plaintiffs' expert witnesses.
The trial court did not limit those experts to
comparisons to utility vehicles on their direct

• Court: Sustained.
Defendants contend that not allowing them to
cross-examine Anderson with regard to
-characteristics of other vehicles and how they
would react under the conditions depicted in
plaintiffs' film left unchallenged the assertions
that track width and center of gravity are the
essential characteristics in determining a
vehicle's rollover susceptibility and that Jeeps
are more dangerous than "other vehicles"
because their track width is narrower and their
center of gravity higher. Mr. Anderson had
been ailowed to compare Jeeps with other
vehicles,
theW.Chevy
Chevette,
Digitizedincluding
by the Howard
Hunter Law
Library, which,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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examination. Hence cross-examination
should not have been so restricted.

_
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could not then refuse defendants the opportunity to rebut assertions made by plaintiffs in
the
presentation of their case. The trial court
IV.
erred
in excluding the film on the basis that
Defendants also contend that the trial court
defendants had failed to comply with orders
erred in excluding certain films and exhibits
regarding discovery.
offered by them as evidence. They called a
Defendants offered a second film in conjuMr. Heitzman as an expert witness to testify
nction with Heitzman's testimony. This film
regarding the handling characteristics of Jeep
showed non-Jeep vehicles doing mechanically
vehicles. He offered a film showing CJ-5s
induced rollovers similar to those shown in
successfully negotiating emergency maneuvers.
plaintiffs' film. After excluding defendants'
Plaintiffs objected on the ground that the
first film for failure to produce it in discovery,
introduction of the film violated previous
the trial court ruled that this second film was
orders of the court regarding discovery. The
not admissible, stating:
objection was sustained.
Now, the other one rests on a difPlaintiffs had submitted interrogatories
ferent principle, I think. And the
seeking any testing Jeep had done regarding
question
that I have there is, the
the handling characteristics of the 1966-73
relevancy of it and whatever else
Jeep Commando. At a hearing on plaintiffs'
you might want to raise.
motion to compel discovery, Judge Sorenson
ordered Jeep to respond to the interrogatory The evidence was offered to rebut the tests
within thirty days. At trial, after hearing arg- shown on plaintiffs' films and to demonstrate
uments in chambers on the admissibility of the that there was no design defect in the Commando because virtually any vehicle would roll
film, the court ruled:
when subjected to such tests.
i* I think that in the context of all the
We have no quarrel with the rule of law
circumstances and with respect to
relied
upon in the dissenting opinion that
'•' discovery procedures ... I think the
"evidence of the condition of other products is
* plaintiffs were entitled to have, or
irrelevant and not admissible to establish a
see, the films and test results before
defect
in a. particular product." This is a
trial pursuant to their discovery
sound
rule
when properly applied as it was in
interrogatories ... , the films are not
the cases cited in the dissenting opinion. For
admissible.
The trial court can exclude evidence that vio- example, in Clark v. Detroit & Mackinac Ry.,
lates discovery orders under rule „ 37 of the 197 Mich. 489, 163 N.W. 964 (1917), a
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, "rowboat rented from the defendant capsized,
defendants point out that the discovery causing four minors to drown. The Michigan
covered only tests of the 1966-73 Jeep court held that it was error to attempt to
Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep prove the unseaworthiness of the capsized boat
CJ-5. The film simply is not covered by the by admitting evidence of the various conditlanguage of the interrogatory. Although plai- ions of repair of the other boats kept for hire
ntiffs' experts were allowed at trial, over by the defendant.
Similarly, in Detroit, T.& I. R.R. v.
objections of defendants, to show films of CJBanning,
173 F.2d 752 (6th Cir.), cert, denied,
5s based on their foundational testimony that
its handling was substantially similar to that of 338 U.S. 815 (1949), also cited in the dissenthe Commando, that ruling does not place the ting opinion, the plaintiff, a railroad brakfilm within the scope of material sought in the eman, was injured while making a flying
pretrial discovery request. The dissenting switch. He brought suit against his employer
opinion would have defendants divine the railroad, contending that the boxcar in which
scope of the requests by a trial court ruling on he was riding and which he was required to
the admissibility of evidence which came much slow down by applying a hand brake had been
later. This burden cannot fairly be placed on pushed too fast by the engine, making it
them. The tests were not produced to show the impossible for him to adequately slow down
handling of the "66-73 Jeep Commando/ the boxcar, which was to couple with a stannor were they offered for that purpose. Def- ding car. At trial, plaintiff was allowed to
endants maintained that the handling of the testify that although he had previously made
CJ-5 and the Commando were not the same. twenty-five to thirty flying switches, none of
The tests were offered to rebut evidence pre- them were made at a rate of speed as high as
sented by plaintiffs that the CJ-5 was defe- the one in which he was injured. On appeal,
ctive because of its handling characteristics. the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it
Although this evidence could have been excl- was error to have admitted the plaintiffs
uded on the basis of relevancy had the trial testimony. Said the court:
No foundation was laid to show the
court earlier excluded plaintiffs' films, once
distance, grade or
the courtDigitized
allowedbyplaintiffs
their
onJ. Reuben circumstances,
the Howard to
W. try
Hunter
Lawcase
Library,
Clark Law School, BYU.
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conducting a drive-through of the accident
operations. We believe the testiscene, and the second showed the same vehicle
mony was improperly admitted.
with outriggers attached doing maneuvers in a
Several factors can affect the speed
parking lot. The trial court ruled that the first
at the time of impact, variable
part of the film was not probative of any
under different operations, irrespissue. We agree. The second part was excluded
ective of the initial speed given to
because the test was not made until after the
the free rolling cars. It is a welltrial had commenced, in violation of pretrial
established rule of evidence that
orders regarding discovery. Counsel for defecircumstances under which other
ndants stated that No. 174 was offered to
comparable conduct occurs should
show the handling characteristics of the 1972
be substantially similar. Wigmore
Commando. Clearly, it came within the scope
on Evidence, 3d ed., vol. II,
of plaintiffs' interrogatories and was properly
§§459, 460 [and citing other
excluded for failure to respond to discovery.
.-':' cases].
In conjunction with exhibit No. 174, the
Banning, 173 F.2d at 756.
trial court viewed a film of a 1970 Ford in a
In the instant case, plaintiffs introduced rollover test (exhibit No. 175). Defendants
films of Jeep CJ-5s rolling. In part I of this offered No. 175 to demonstrate the movement
opinion, we upheld the admissibility of those of vehicle occupants during a rollover. The
films because of the substantial similarity of trial court determined that the film was not
the vehicle shown in the films to the vehicle in
probative and excluded it. The film was disswhich plaintiffs were injured. However, plaiimilar to the accident, was not necessary to
ntiffs in presenting their case did not stop
rebut any evidence offered by plaintiffs, and
there. They produced several experts who
was not probative of any disputed issue. There
repeatedly in their testimony drew compariwas therefore no error in the exclusion of
sons of the rollover tendencies of Jeep vehicles
defendants' exhibit No. 175.
to non-Jeep vehicles. Plaintiffs' aim was to
Defendants' expert, Dr. Warner, offered
show that the Jeep in which they were riding
exhibit
No. 130, a storyboard, to illustrate his
was of an unsafe design and had a tendency to
testimony
that the vehicle in question had been
roll much easier than other vehicles. For
involved
in
a prior accident that compromised
•example, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Shaw, testithe
structural
integrity of the roof. Plaintiffs'
fied: "There is no doubt that this vehicle is
counsel
objected,
claiming that the exhibit was
much more prone to roll over than some
others." Likewise, plaintiffs' expert, Mr. not material. The trial court sustained the
Noettl, testified that "it was very difficult to objection. Plaintiffs' experts had testified that
turn a passenger car. over." Finally, Mr. the roof of the vehicle was defectively desiAnderson, another of plaintiffs' experts, tes- gned, thus contributing to plaintiffs' injuries.
tified that Jeep vehicles have "a delay in the Evidence illustrating how the roof had been
handling response" that is greater than S10 damaged in a prior accident was relevant to
Blazers and Chevy Chevettes. Under the rule rebut this assertion. The trial court erred in
of law relied upon by the dissenting opinion, sustaining plaintiffs' objection to exhibit No.
that evidence of the condition of other prod- 130.
Defendants also offered exhibit No. 164, a
ucts is not admissible to establish a defect in a
series
of five photographs showing live models
particular product, it may be questioned
whether such comparisons should have been posed in a static vehicle to represent passenger
admitted because of the lack of similarity. movement in a rollover. This was offered to
..... However, right or wrong, plaintiffs' experts illustrate the testimony of Dr. Warner that the
were allowed to draw the comparisons between movement of the passengers, not the design of
the rollover propensities of Jeep and non- the vehicle, caused the injuries. The trial court
Jeep vehicles. Certainly then, defendants initially admitted and then excluded the
should have been allowed in rebuttal to prove exhibit, stating:
the experience of plaintiffs' experts and to
The probative value is limited at
introduce into evidence the film showing nonleast because of the photographs
Jeep vehicles doing mechanically induced rolnot being representative of just
lovers similar to those shown in plaintiffs'
what did happen to the vehicles ...
film. This situation is wholly different from
or the people in them.
the situations in the two above cases relied While it is not clear whether the basis of the
upon in the dissenting opinion where the pla- trial court's ruling was relevance, Utah R.
intiff was not allowed to make comparisons Evid. 401, or that the probative value was
when the circumstances were dissimilar.
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
The third film that'defendants claim was confusion of the issues, etc., Utah R. Evid.
wrongfully excluded was offered as exhibit 403, we will uphold the trial court's ruling
No. 174, a video produced by defendants' where there is any valid basis to do so. State
expert, Dr. Warner. It consisted of two parts: v. Cray, 111 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986).
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uded the evidence under either theory; therefore, we find no error in «the exclusion of
exhibit No. 164.
V.
. Defendants also contend that the trial court
erred in excluding all references to the availability of seatbelts and plaintiffs' failure to
use them. Plaintiffs made a motion in limine
to exclude all evidence of seatbelts. The trial
court excluded such evidence, stating:
[T]o speculate what the seatbelt
might have done in this type of
situation is just something that the
jury ought not to, and they will not
have, under my ruling, the obligation to consider .... I want no more
evidence in this case with regard to
seatbelts.
Defendants contend that the evidence of seatbelts was relevant and necessary to show (1)
that their presence was a factor the jury
should consider when determining if the
vehicle was unsafe as designed, and (2) that
plaintiffs' injuries could have been prevented
or lessened by the use of seatbelts and therefore the jury should be allowed to determine
whether plaintiffs' duty of ordinary care or
their duty to mitigate damages required them
to wear seatbelts.
' We agree that evidence of how the presence
of seatbelts affected the design safety of the
vehicle should be admitted. However, the bulk
of defendants' proffered evidence and the
main thrust of their argument regarding seatbelts was directed at plaintiffs' failure to use
them as constituting contributory negligence or
failure to mitigate damages. The majority of
the cases cited in the briefs submitted to this
Court have rejected this approach. See Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 187 Mont.
471, 610 P.2d 668 (1980) (for citations to
other jurisdictions which have rejected this
approach). More persuasively, the legislature
has passed Utah Code Ann. §41-6-186
(1988), which provides:
The failure to wear a seat belt does
not constitute contributory or
comparative negligence and may not
be introduced as evidence in any
civil litigation on the issue of injuries or on the issue of mitigation of
damages.
Although this statute was passed subsequent to
the litigation sub judice and was therefore not
controlling at trial, we nonetheless decline to
place ourselves in the awkward position of
adopting a stance that is in direct contravention of express legislation. We therefore find
that the trial court did not err in excluding
evidence that the failure to use seatbelts constituted contributory negligence or failure to
mitigate damages.

VI.
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
states that error may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected. In .the instant case, the trial court erroneously excluded evidence offered by defendants. That evidence was necessary to rebut the
assertions that plaintiffs made to establish
liability. This error was compounded by
unduly restricting the scope of defendants'
cross-examination. Given the conflicting
testimony presented on this key issue, we
cannot say that the substantial rights of defendants were not affected by the combined
effects of the erroneous exclusion of the evidence and the limitation of crossexamination. While no one error by itself
perhaps mandates reversal, the cumulative
effect of the several errors undermines our
confidence that defendants were able to
present to the jury their theory of the case and
that a fair trial was had.
We therefore reverse and remand for a new
trial.
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
1- Variable Annuity Life Insurance has filed a separate appeal on the issue of vicarious liability. See
Whitehead v v Variable Annuity Life Insurance. Co.,
101 Utah Adv. Rep 24, decided also today.
2. Judge Sorensen, after hearing most of the pretrial
matters, retired and did not preside at the trial.

STEWART; Justice: (Dissenting)
After a two- and one-half-week trial
which produced some 5,000 pages of transcript, a verdict was returned for plaintiff
Stephen Whitehead for damages produced by
the tragic and permanent injuries suffered in
the rollover of a Jeep Commando. The Court
reverses the jury verdict and judgment on the
basis of a few evidentiary rulings culled from
a host of such rulings. The Court holds that
the trial court erred in (1) limiting defendants'
cross-examination, and (2) excluding defendants* films. I submit that the trial court was
clearly correct and that, in any event, the
rulings fall within a trial judge's discretion.
For these reasons, I dissent.
I

L LIMITATIONS OF DEFENDANTS'
CROSS-EXAMINATION
The majority holds that -the trial court
improperly limited defendants' crossexamination of plaintiffs' experts. The majority cites three instances in which the trial
court "cut o f f defendants' attempts to crossexamine plaintiffs' experts and which prevented defendants from probing the basis of
opinions given by plaintiffs' experts.
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This Court has long held that the trial court
has considerable discretion in determining
whether evidence is relevant. Bambrough v.
Betters, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). The
judgment of the trial court in admitting or
excluding evidence should not be reversed
absent an abuse of discretion, and only when
the error is prejudicial. State v. Miller, 727
P.2d 203 (Utah 1986); State v. McClain, 706
P.2d 603 (Utah 1985); Terry v. Zion's Coop.
Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979).
Generally, evidence of the condition of other
products is irrelevant and not admissible to
establish a defect in a particular product. See
Detroit, T. & I. R.R. v. Banning, 173 F.2d
752, 756 (6th Cir.), cerf. denied, 338 U.S. 815
(1949); Clark v. Detroit & M. Ry., 197 Mich.
489, 503, 163 N.W. 964, 968 (1917); 29 Am.
JUT. 2d Evidence §302, at 348 (1967); 32
C.J.S. Evidence §583, at 712 (1964). Thus, it
is. irrelevant whether the Jeep Commando was
unreasonably dangerous compared with other
makes or models of automobiles generally.
The only relevant inquiry is the turnover
characteristics of the Jeep Commando and
other vehicles substantially similar to it.1
In this case, the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion by ruling that the scope of crossexamination would include only comparisons
of vehicles with the same or similar characteristics as the Jeep Commando. The court,
during the course of the trial, reminded defendants' counsel that only evidence of similar
T vehicles would be admitted:
tj.«4

-].... The Court: I don't think I've
prohibited any kind of cross examination with reference to vehicles
that had the same or similar characteristics; to-wit: center of gravity
and wheel width, that Jeep has.
Mr. Mandlebaum [attorney for
defendant AMC/Jeep]: Well, I
may be incorrect. But I believe you
have, your Honor. I thought the
Court's ruling was that we could
not compare other vehicles.
•;\' The Court: No. The only ruling
;*
that I have made with regard to
r :
; that, at least, at least that's my
'intent, was that unless the vehicles
were similar, that I wasn't going to
permit you to compare them in
order to show that other vehicles
might be as dangerous as this
vehicle.
The majority now holds that the trial
court's limitations on cross-examination
interfered with defendants' ability to attack
the foundation of the opinions of plaintiffs'
expert witnesses. Defendant was allowed,
however, to introduce such evidence when it
was intended to go to credibility, as shown
below.
The majority cites three examples of the

JJ

trial court's limitation of AMC/Jeep's crossexamination. The examples cited do not prove
that there was a limitation of crossexamination as to any "critical aspect of plaintiffs' proof." In light of the trial court's
ruling that only evidence of vehicles with the
same or substantially similar characteristics
would be admissible, evidence of other nonsimilar types of vehicles was inadmissible
absent some special relevancy.
Every ruling criticized by the majority was
in fact required by the court's pretrial ruling,
yet the majority does not even discuss the
validity of that ruling. Indeed, the majority's
view of this case would allow defendants to
delve into the rollover -characteristics of every
single type of four-wheeled passenger vehicle
on the road. Such a ruling would have made it
virtually impossible to try this case. It is, of
course, self-evident that all four-wheeled
vehicles can be rolled over. Whether a vehicle
is defectively designed depends upon whether
the vehicle is dangerous when used under the
ordinary conditions of its intended use. That
should be determined by examining vehicles
that are designed for similar purposes, i.e.,
utility vehicles in this case, as the trial judge
ruled. In my view, the majority undermines
the trial judge's ability to manage a case such
as this by permitting defendant to explore on
cross-examination matters of highly attenuated relevancy.
The majority's first example of limitation
of cross-examination arises out of plaintiffs'
expert's testimony on direct examination
concerning the "handling characteristics of
Blazers, Chevy Chevettes, and CJ-7s." On
direct examination, the expert stated:
Q: And what type of handling
and maneuvering tests did you
perform last week?
- A: Well, I had some instrument
tests that I performed on four different vehicles. I had a CJ-5, a CJ7, a small Blazer, the new F10 [sicj
size Blazer, and the Chevy Chevette.
Q: And what did the results show
in regard to your tests on the Jeep
itself?
A: Well, all the results are preliminary. I don't have all the data
reduced yet. But my preliminary
quick look at that data indicates
that the Jeep vehicles both overturn
at speeds of 20 to 25 miles an hour,
and they both have a delay in the
handling response that's in the
magnitude of a half a second before
the vehicle is stabilized to turn.
The other vehicles I tested, the
S10 Blazer and the Chevy Chevette,
they did not have delays of that
magnitude. They were much less.
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The majority cites the following, which occurred in the context of the above testimony, as
a limitation of cross-examination:
Q: Are there other vehicles that
have the same track widthMr. Howard [plaintiffs* counsel]:
Object. Repetitious and irrelevant.
Court: Sustained on the grounds
it's irrelevant.
Q: Are there other vehicles that
have about the same center of
gravity?
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's
irrelevant.
Court: Sustained.
Q: If you drive a three-quarterton pickup, is it the same as driving
a Honda Accord; handling, steering?
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's
irrelevant.
Court: Sustained.
Q: [TJake another vehicle that
has wider track width and lower
[center of gravity], can it be rolled
on a level surface with driver[steering] input?
Mr. Howard: Objection. It's
irrelevant.
Court: Sustained.
Defendants' attempted cross-examination of
plaintiffs' expert went far beyond the scope of
the trial judge's order limiting the evidence
and also beyond the scope of direct examination. There was no testimony on direct concerning the rollover propensities, track width,
or center of gravity of "other vehicles" in
general. The only testimony given on direct
examination related to the 'handling response" time of the CJ-5, CJ-7, S10 Blazer,
and Chevy Chevette, all of which are utility
vehicles having general characteristics substantially similar to the Jeep Commando. I
submit that the trial court did not err in limiting cross-examination.
The second example cited by the majority of
improper limitation of cross-examination
occurred in the following exchange on defendants' cross-examination of plaintiffs'
expert:
Q: What experience have you had
in trying to roll over a passenger
vehicle?
Mr. Johnson [plaintiffs' counsel]:
Object on the basis of relevancy.
Court: I don't want to get into
testing all other kinds of vehicles,
because we've got enough problems
with the one. So, I'm going to
sustain the objection.

CODE• Co
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The cross-examination question above was
based on an assumption made by plaintiffs'
expert and found in the following direct examination:
Q: When you started out with
this particular test, did you know
exactly what speeds and what input
it would take to turn the CJ-5
over?
A: No, absolutely. It was just the
opposite. That the belief was, that
since it was very difficult to turn a
passenger car over, especially on a
flat surface at low speeds, that it
would be difficult to do this with a
Jeep, too.
As is evident from the above, plaintiffs'
expert did not purport to have experience in
testing or researching the rollover propensities
of "passenger cars/ nor did he claim to have
experience in rolling vehicles other than the CJ5. He clearly stated that he started with the
belief thai since it was difficult to roll a passenger car, it would also be difficult to roll a
CJ-5. The testimony on direct examination
only made passing reference to "passenger
cars." The focus of the examination clearly
was not on the rollover propensity of passenger cars* land the trial judge was clearly
within the ambit of reasonable discretion in
s u s t a i n i n g the objection on crossexamination.. £ ' r .
Nevertheless,'after sustaining the objection
as to "passenger cars," the court allowed
defendant AMC to cross-examine about
"utility vehicles" because of their substantial
similarity to the CJ-5 and the Jeep Commando:
Mr. Jensen [attorney for defendants]:
What about the vehicles similar
to the CJ-5; that is utility vehicles? The Scout, Landcruiser, and
that class of vehicles? The small
pickups, narrow and with equivalent center of gravity?
. Mr. Johnson [plaintiffs' counsel]:
Object on the basis of relevance and
foundation. Outside the scope of
direct.
• The Court: What is the relevance?
Mr. Jensen: Similar vehicles,
Your Honor.
The Court: The same width, the
sameMr. Jensen: Similar track width
and center of gravity.
The Court: You may answer.
Thus, there was no limitation on crossexamination about substantially similar vehicles.
The majority's third example of an impr-
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oper limitation of cross-examination, if read
in context, reveals that the judge sustained an
objection that went only to the form of the
question. Since a question that is barred
because of its form may always be rephrased,
and since defendants' question was not rephrased, it simply is not true that the trial court
limited cross-examination in this instance. In
the following testimony, the focus of crossexamination was on a direct, straight-on rearend collision to a vehicle without any lateral
forces:
•Q: So would you expect that
•Y iv vehicle to stay on the road?
A: Again, under a hypothetical
thing where you just have an impact
from the rear, no lateral forces are
put in, yes, it will stay right on the
road.
Q: No problem at all staying on
the road?
A: No problem at all.
Q: The driver just rides it out and
no problem?
A: Under those conditions I
described, yes. If you have no
" lateral forces acting on the vehicle,
;!
[noj side forces, the vehicle isn't
.*;;*' going to turn over.
^ 1 , Q : AH "gin. That would apply
:
^ - Whether it's a Commando or some
"r':J.."'""other vehicle?
, \;;, A: In my opinion, that's correct.
ri
Q: All right. And what distance
would it take for a driver to get
that vehicle under control, and
* r . could he do it within the width of
three lanes of the freeway?
Mr. Johnson: Outside the scope,
Your Honor. We object to it. Secondly, the facts of this case are
clearly lateral force. The evidence at
this point is uncontroverted that six
inches, the Oldsmobile hit six inches
of the Jeep on a specific corner. We
don't have a direct back input.
The Court: I'm going to take an
.afternoon recess at this time. I'll
t -overrule your objection with respect
•""} to it not being within the scope of
- t h e direct examination. But I will
#
sustain it with regard to the form of
the question. And when we come
back you may go from there.

35

vehicle would come out of that situation unscathed, basically?
Mr. Johnson: Your Honor, the
Court sustained the objection as to
the form of the question.
The Court: And I'll sustain the
objection to that question.
Besides asking about the effect of a direct rear
impact without lateral forces, the question was
ambiguous and too broad and, at the least,
should have been restated. The trial court
acted well within its discretion, and in any
event, the incident is unimportant to the
outcome of the trial.
In fact, full cross-examination of plaintiffs' experts' qualifications and experience
was allowed.2 For example, Mr. Jensen,
counsel for AMC/Jeep, cross-examined Mr.
Noettl, plaintiffs' expert, on his knowledge of
vehicle rollover literature. Mr. Noettl identified various tests, reports, and studies concerning vehicle rollover thresholds and vehicle
characteristics. Overruling plaintiffs' objection
to a question concerning the rollover propensity of big trucks, the court stated:
Overruled. It may or may not be.
I have not changed my ruling with
respect to other matters, in permitting him to go into this. This may
have something to do with credibility, veracity, accuracy,, or whatever.
The cross-examination of Mr. Anderson,
another of plaintiffs' experts, also demonstrates that defendants were not prevented from
questioning an expert about his experience and
qualifications.
This Court has ruled that counsel should
make clear to the trial judge the relevance of
cross-examination questions when an objection is sustained on relevancy grounds. Stare
v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1986). See
aiso State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah
1986). In none of the present instances where
the majority rules that the trial court improperly sustained plaintiffs' objections to questions regarding other vehicles did defense
counsel state the relevance of those questions.
Absent an explanation of the relevance of the
line of inquiry, exclusion was properly called
for under the pretrial ruling, which certainly
was within the discretion of the court. If,
indeed, the point was to attack the foundation
of the expert's opinion-and not to confuse
the substantive issue of determining whether
the Commando was defective-that should
have been explained to the trial court. Otherwise, the trial court was certainly entitled to
assume that defendants sought to circumvent
the judge's ruling on relevancy.

Q [By Mr. Jensen]: Thank you,
Your Honor.
I think we were talking about
what you would expect to happen
to the Commando or any vehicle
that's hit under the circumstances
that you have been describing?
II. EXCLUSION OF FILMS
A: Yes.
The trial court's decision to exclude defenQ: byAnd
do you
feelLawlike
anyJ. Reuben Clark
dants'
films
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discretion. One film portrayed non-Jeep
vehicles performing mechanically induced
rollovers in a manner somewhat similar to
those shown in plaintiffs' film. The court
ruled:
[IJt's irrelevant, and it's irrelevant
because they involve other vehicles
which the jury would have to take
into consideration as to how it was
done, the comparisons, the whole
works.

CODE^CO
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court erred in excluding defendants' film of a
Jeep CJ-5 on the basis that it violated a
discovery order directing defendants to answer
an interrogatory that would have disclosed the
existence of the film. The majority states:
'[Defendants point out that the discovery
covered only tests of the 1966-73 Jeep
Commando. The film offered was of a Jeep
CJ-5. The film simply is not covered by the
language of the interrogatory." I submit the
majority is simply in error in stating that the
interrogatory did not cover the film. The interrogatory directed defendants to "state
And the other witnesses have seen
whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep
the Jeep film. And I've let him
Corporation tested for or otherwise determtestify with regard to his version of
ined
the handling characteristics and qualities
those tests with regard to the Jeep.
of said automobiles [Commandos] both during
I kept out the other because I
the development and subsequently to the
thought they were irrelevant on the
initial production ...."
issue as to whether or not the Jeep
The interrogatory specifically requested
was defectively designed, and I still
information as to all tests, even those subsethink it is.
quent to production, to determine the handling characteristics and qualities of the ComBecause each of those tests are mando.
Defendants' tests of the Jeep CJ-5
they have a - they're not all
were,
in
fact, used to determine the handling
exactly the same. You don't even
characteristics and qualities of the Jeep
have the same vehicle. And we'd
Commando, contrary to the assertion of the
have to determine the reliability of
majority that the films were not offered for
the tests for each individual car or .
the
purpose of showing the handling of the
automobile. And I'm not going to
'66-73 Commando. The CJ-5 was shown
, letthejurydothat.
Defendants argued before the trial court that by foundational testimony to be substantially
plaintiffs had at least three different tests or similar to the Jeep Commando. A vehicle is
films in evidence showing different vehicles substantially similar only if it has substantially
making different maneuvers, all of which the same characteristics and qualities. The
interrogatory requested information concerinvolved different steering inputs at different
ning not only the subsequent testing of Comspeeds. The judge responded that those tests
mandos^ but also the testing for, or otherwise
and films were admitted because expert testidetermining, the characteristics or qualities of
mony established that the vehicles depicted in
the Commando. Such testing included the CJthe films were substantially the same as the 5 because it had many of the same characterJeep Commando involved in this case:
istics and qualities of a Commando. Other- The Court: That's the only reason.
wise, the CJ-5 film would have been irreleThe rest of them were out. And
vant to defendants' case and inadmissible.3
I'm going to keep them all out.
The majority claims, however, that defen-The majority holds that because plaintiffs' dants were forced to "divine the scope-of the
experts were allowed to draw the comparisons requests by a trial court ruling on the admisbetween the rollover propensities of Jeep and sibility of evidence which came much later."
non-Jeep vehicles, defendants should also Defendants were instructed, weeks before trial,
have been allowed to introduce a film of non- that they could cross-examine but were "not
Jeep vehicles doing mechanically induced rol- to bring up new facts which were not given
lovers. As stated earlier, evidence of the con- plaintiffs' counsel in their response to interrdition of other products is generally not ogatories." Given the purpose of submitting
admissible to prove a defect in a particular the CJ-5 film-to show the characteristics
product. See Banning, 173 F.2d at 756; Clark, of the Commando-defendants had prior
197 Mich, at 503, 163 N.W. at 968; 29 Am. notice and should not be able to influence the
Jur. Evidence §302; 32 C.J.S. Evidence outcome of this long and difficult case by
§583. Such evidence is admissible, however, surprise. The tests of the CJ-5 clearly fell
when the products are substantially similar. within the scope of the interrogatory in quesThere is no evidence that defendants' film tion. The trial court properly excluded the test
showed vehicles which were substantially film on the ground that defendants failed to
similar. Plaintiffs' film, however, was of comply with discovery orders based on that
vehicles substantially similar to the Jeep interrogatory. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1284-85 (Wyo.
Commando.
In addition, the majority rules that the trial 1983) (exclusion of defendants' rollover film
violation
discovery
order was within
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. for
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Clark Lawof
School,
BYU.
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broad discretion of trial court).
Finally, the majority opinion states that it
was improper for the trial court to exclude
exhibit No. 130, a storyboard illustrating
defendants' expert's testimony "that the
vehicle in question had been involved in a
prior accident that compromised the structural
integrity of the roof." This question goes more
to damages rather than liability. Its admissibility turned on a whole host of variables.
Determination of admissibility is in the trial
judge's discretion.
Durham, Justice, concurs in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Julie Warren VERDE,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20954
FILED: February 3,1989

1. The majority opinion concedes that only films THIRD DISTRICT
showing accidents of a similar nature are admissible* Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
and that the trial court correctly excluded one of
defendants' films on this basis. However, the maj- ATTORNEYS:
ority appears to reject the proposition that the scope Robert Van Sciver, Margo L. James, Salt
of both direct and cross-examination may be proLake City, for appellant
perly limited to similar vehicles.
2. On a related point, the majority accepts AMC's R. Paul Van Dam, Earl F. Dorius, Salt Lake
City, for appellee
contention that
not allowing them to cross-examine
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Anderson with regard to characteristics
Defendant Julie Verde appeals from her
_ of other vehicles and how they would
conviction, following a jury trial, of the,
V. . react under the conditions depicted in
offense of the sale of a child. See Utah Code
\;; • plaintiffs' film left unchallenged the
: r?
Ann. §76-7-203 (1978). She claims that
V assertions that track width and center of
certain evidence was improperly admitted, that
^-gravity were the essential characteristics
the jury was improperly instructed, and that
in determining a vehicle's rollover susthere was insufficient evidence on one element
• ceptibility and that Jeeps were more
of the crime. We affirm.
v dangerous than other vehicles'because
We recite the facts from the .record on
their track width was narrower and their
appeal in the light most favorable to the
center of gravity higher.
That is not correct. Defendants elicited such evid- jurys verdict. CL, e.g., State v. Booker, 709
ence from its own expert witness, Edward Heit- P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); Von Hake v.
zman. Heitzman testified at length concerning the Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985); Scharf
factors that determine the susceptibility to rollover v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070
of vehicles in general. Heitzman testified about (Utah 1985); Sugar v. Miller, 6 Utah 2d 433,
numerous other vehicles (including both utility
vehicles and passenger cars) which have a center of 436, 315 P.2d 862, 864 (1957) (all addressing
gravity equal to or higher than the Jeep Commando. challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence).
Heitzman also testified extensively about the static Verde met the State's chief witness, Tammy
stability ratio, which was relied on by plaintiffs' Watson, at the physician's office where
experts, to determine a vehicle's propensity to roll Watson worked and Verde was being treated..
over. In fact, Heitzman had a list of vehicles with After hearing that Watson had recently sufftheir static stability ratios which formed the basis ered a miscarriage, Verde approached hex
for his testimony regarding the comparison of the about the possibility of arranging for the
Jeep with other vehicles. After extensive discussion,
private adoption of a third party's child.,
the list itself was admitted into evidence.
3. Defendants claim now on appeal that *[i]t was a Verde and Watson continued discussing the
film made in 1983 of a Jeep CJ-5 and had nothing proposed adoption on a regular basis from.
to do with the 1972 Commando.r (Emphasis in September of 1984 until February of 1985.
original.) If that is true, we should affirm the trial
In these discussions, Verde indicated that
court's order on grounds of irrelevancy.
Watson should expect to incur medical, legal,
and other costs incident to the adoption
ranging between $2,500 and S5,000. During
this period, Watson arranged to pay J80 to
$90 of Verde's medical care costs in return for
Verde's commitment to give her a "discount"
on the adoption expenses. Verde claimed that
she was in the process of setting up a private
adoption agency and was working with a local
However,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben attorney.
Clark Law School,
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, for:
1

HOWARD. LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 EAST SOO NORTH S T R U T

2

P. O. Box 7 7 8
PROVO. UTAH 84601
TELEPHONE:

3

373*6345

4
5

Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f s

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

6

STATE OF UTAH

"7
8

DEBORAH WHITEHEAD AND STEVEN
9 WHITEHEAD,
INTERROGATORIES
Plaintiffs,

10
11

12 LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
13 and AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION, JEEP CORPORATION,
14
Defendants.
15
16

SJdk
Civil No. 5>rG3lf

Plaintiffs submit herewith the following interrogatories to be

17 answered by the defendant according to the provisions of Rule 33 of
18 the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure under oath and within thirty (30)
19 days of service hereof.

These interrogatories are intended to be

20 continuing so as to require a supplementation of response to the
21 full extent required in Rule 26(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce22 dure.
23
24

DEFINITIONS
The definitions set forth below shall be used for the purposes

25 of these interrogatories.
26

L.

The term "you" or "your" shall mean and include the defen-

21 dant and any employee, officer, agent, attorney or other individual
28 under the control of American Motors Corporation, Jeep Corporation.
29

2.

The term "document" shall mean and include any letter,

30 telegram, note, memorandum, record, operating statement, balance
31 sheet, budget, contract, invoice, order, memorandum of any tele32
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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phone or personal conference or conversation, inter-office memorandum, microfilm, booklet, circular, pamphlet, study, notice, compute
run- or print-out, tape recording of any statement or conversation
or transcription of any mechanically recorded statement or conversation and any other writing of any nature, however produced or reproduced, including copies of such documents (excepting those documents
prepared by legal counsel solely for the purpose of this litigation)
3.

The term "identify" when used in relation to the term docu-

ments, shaLl require the defendant to state with regard to each

10 (document so designated:
11

a.

The date of the documents;

12

b.

The description of the document in sufficient detail tcj>

13 |enabLe it to be specifically identified?

2!

14

c.

The name of the author of the document;

15

d.

The name and business adress of the persons presently

8*6
QO

»

go

5s *« •JL
j, dw tH I
z
o *x £
Z

16 |having custody of the documents;

1Q2 o<"

e. The name and business address of each person having
*8g»SsJ 17
3gjo g -g
.< 3*-o Sj
18 [knowledge of any factual assertions reflected in said document.
Q (n HI a s|
£"S H
f. The name of each recipient of the doucment;
|i"
19
oP
*3
g. A statement explaining in reasonable detail the con20

21 tents of the document.
22

4.

The term "identify" when used in referring to individuals

23 or business entities shall mean and require the defendant to state
24 with regard to each individual so designated:
25

a.

The name of the individual or business entity;

26

b.

The present office or home address;

21

c.

The individual's present employer.

28

5.

The term "identify" when use in relation to the terms

29 "test", "studies", or "evaluations", shall require the defendant
30 with regard to each test, study or evaluation so designated:
31

a.

The approximate date such tests, studies, or evalua-

32 tions were accomplished;
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1.1Q

b.

1

The names and addresses of the personnel who con-

2 ducted such test, studies, or evaluations;
c.

3

The results obtained in conducting such tests, studies

4 or evaluations;
d.

5

List any written reports or memoranda which were pre-

6 pared on the basis of such tests, studies or evaluations;
7

e.

The names and addresses of the personnel who prepared

8 or authored the* documents mentioned in subparagraph d above;
9

f.

The present location and name of the custodian of such

10 documents mentioned in subparagraph d above and attach copies.
11

6.

Each paragraph and subparagraph of these interrogatories

12 shall be construed independently and not by reference to any other
13 paragraph or subparagraph for purposes of limitation.
INTERROGATORIES

14
15

L.

Please identify the person answering these interrogatories

16 and his relationship or position with defedant.
17

2.

Identify the total number, broken down by make, model/

18 series, and model year of "Jeep Comando" vehicles manufactured by
19 American Motors Company, Jeep Corporation (hereinafter American
20 Motors).
21

3.

With respect to the vehicles indicated in the previous

22 interrogatory, please identify all of the vehicles by year

and

23 model which were sold without 1) roll bars, or, 2) lap, shoulder, or
24 harness type seat belts.
25

4.

With respect to the vehicles indicated in interrogatory #2,

26 please indicate by model and year, the number of vehicles sold with
27 canvas, fiberglass, or other non-rigid cab enclosures.
28

5.

With respect to the vehicles indicated in the three pre-

29 vious interrogatories, please furnish the number of all owner report
30 or consumer complaints from all sources either received by American
31 Motors or of which American Motors, is aware alleging injury or
32 fatality as a result of the malfunction or lack of a safety roll
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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bar, non-rigid cab enclosures, or seat, lap or harness type seat
belts.

Include all reports or complaints, whether or not they have

been verified by American Motors.
6.

With respect to each owner report or consumer

complaint

referred to in answer to the previous interrogatory, please identify
the contents of each and every document in accordance with the defin
tions preceding these interrogatories.
7.

Please furnish the number of all owner reports or consumer

[complaints from all sources either received by American Motors

io

|or of which American Motors is otherwise aware alleging injury or

n

fatality resulting from on-toad accidents involving roll-over of

1 2 [jeep vehicles or uncontrollability thereof.

Include all reports or

1 3 complaints, whether or not they have been verified by American

si
25fi

14 plotors Corporation.

&S*

5 15

"a;.

S 1 6 [referred to in answer to the previous interrogatory, identify the

8.

With respect to each* owner report or consumer

complaint

«» IF:

17 bontents of each and every document in accordance with the defini°*
6
*8g» f.3
g 1 8 tions preceeding these interrogatories. In the alternative, attach
z

U Q n 0
J Z H .
a

.< 5

55

Q OT W

51?

1 9 |a copy of the designated documents.

20

9.

Specify what investigations American Motors Corporation

21 [undertook in regard to each of the accidents, injuries and/or
22 fatalities, identified in answer to interrogatory #7.
23

10.

Specify with particularity the results of American Motor's

24 investigation into the accidents, injuries and/or fatalities identi25 fied in answer to interrogatory #7.
26

11.

Identify all lawsuits, both pending and closed by title,

27 jcoutt, location and docket number in which American Motors is
28 jr was a defendant against allegations of malfunction or failure
29 |of the types listed in interrogatory #5.
30

12.

Identify all claims, both pending and closed, by name and

31 [address of the claimant in which American Motors was requested to
bay damages because of allegations of malfunction or

failure of the
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types indicated in interrogatory #5.

2

13.

State what amount, if any, American Motors paid on each of

3 the claims identified in the previous interrogatory.
4

14.

State the name and addresses of all persons or groups of

5 persons at American Motors who. participated in the design, manu6 facture and sell of the Jeep Commando automobile.

Give the approxi-

7 mate date of such decision.
8

15.

State the names and addresses of all persons or groups of

9 bersons at American Motors who designed and planned the complete
10 structure and unit of the Jeep Commando automobile.

Give the proxim

11 pnd inclusive dates when the above was accomplished.
12

16.

With reference to the design, planning, and manufacture of

13 [the complete structure and unit of the Jeep Commando automobile, giv

S3

14 |the following information:

^z

15

Kbi.

a.

List by American Motors index number, the plans,

bJ < g
Ui 5 t-

16 bngineoring drawings, and blueprints prepared for the development of

o ^

"0« gn
d x f j w 17
paid automobiles; (describe the subject on each print, drawing or
z
:" * * £

g a! > S

0 w
*88-5j
18 pludpr int)
3 i 1°o g
19
.<
b.

List the plans, engineering drawings, blueprints and

Q w ui

< z SI

IE

20 specifications in their completed or final form that were used for
21 the production and assembly stages for said automobiles; (describe
22 the subject on each print, drawing or blueprint)
23

c.

The names and addresses of the person, persons or grou

24 of persons who authored, prepared, supervised and approved the
25 documents mentioned in a and b above;
26

d.

The approximate dates the documents mentioned in a

21 and b above were prepared, completed and approved;
28

e.

The present location and name and address of the

29 custodian of the documents mentioned in (a) and (b) above.
30

17.

State whether American Motors determined the approximate

31 or exact position of the center of gravity for any or all Jeep
32 Commando autmobiles for the model years 1970-77 inclusive, under
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iai

[different passenger load conditions.
IB.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory was in the

(affirmative, please state the approximate, or if known, the exact
location of the center of gravity in the Jeep Commando automobiles
produced for the model years 1970-77 inclusive, for passenger load
ponditions varying from 0-4 passengers inclusive.
19.

State the approximate standard passenger weight employed

in answering the previous interrogatory, and also the passenger distribution pattern in the automobiles for each model.
10

20.

State the approximate, or if known, the exact location of

11 the center of gravity on a certain 1972 Jeep Comando, VIN JLA 87H
12 1/H21309, for all passenger load conditions varying from 0-4
13 passengers inclusive.
14

V)

£5 C
QO

•J

<tf w

Z

«
s

§«

With reference to the design and development of the Jeep

15 ominando automobile, state whether American Motors Corporation testecj

* > < * <0

£ N

W

«

°*XE

« " o <

n

*8g«5«
Q
U j„ g .-O -O
K. ^
< O5 a - o «
Q
< zen2w c rf
K >: o
°- H

l?

21.

16 ifor or otherwise determined the handling characteristics and
17 Qualities of said automobiles both during the development and sub18 equently to the initial production of said automobiles.
19

22.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

20 [affirmative, please identify any such tests in accordance with
21 the definitions preceeding these interrogatories.
22

23.

If the answer to interrogatory #21 is in the affirmative,

23 |please supply the following additional information:
24

a.

With respect to the handling qualities and charac-

25 teristics of said Jeep Commando autmobiles, what safety standards
26 land criteria were utilized by American Motors Corporation in
27 [designing and developing said automobiles;
28

b.

Whether American Motors Corporation tested for or

29 [evaluated the tendency of said Jeep Comando automobiles to either
30 understeer or oversteer at different operating conditions;
31

c.

If the answer to b above is in the affirmative, state

32 specifically how such tests and evaluations were accomplished.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

24.

State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested for

2 or otiiorwise evaluated the directional stability or handling charac3 teristics of the Jeep Commando automobile under impact conditions,
4

2'5.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

5 affirmative, identify all such tests and/or evaluations in accord6 ance with the definitions preceeding these interrogatories.
7

26.

State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested

8 for or otherwise evaluated the operational directional stability
9 |or handling characteristics of the Jeep Commando automobile under
1 0 real or simulated cross wind conditions during the development of
1 1 [said automobiles or subsequently to the initial production of said
1 2 [automobiles.
13

§i

27.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

1 4 |affc"imative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance

®i

1 5 pith the definitions preceeding these interrogatories.
w *R2 •
z
28. State whether American Motors Corporation tested for or
°* r £ 1 6
n
lfl3Zg<
n
S 3 g b « 1 7 (otherwise evaluated the aero-dynamic properties of the Jeep Commando
tctt
Q. 9 w „ • «

W O « 0 0- o
Qinui

8 9 1 8 automobile during the development of said automobiles or subsequent

< z2

1 9 to the initial production said automobiles.
20

29.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

21 of f: irmat ive, please identify such tests and/or evaluations in
22 [accordance with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.
23

30.

State what instructions were included in any manual or

24 (other document which was given to the consumer or purchaser or any
25 Jeep Commando automobile which stated any particular problem or
26 (problems relating to vehicle handling characteristics which might
27 be encountered in driving or operating said automobiles.

Please

28 put line in detail such instructions or attach a copy thereof.
29

31.

State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested for

30 br otherwise evaluated the effect of safety roll bars in Jeep
31 (Commando automobiles as related to the prevention of physical in32 juries and/or fatalities to the passengers in said automobiles in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the event of a roll-over or other accident,
32.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance
|with the definitions preceeding these interrogatories.
33.

State if American Motors Corporation decided to install

troll bars in the Jeep Commando automobile after the model year 1972,
[and if such decision was made, state the grounds upon which it was
Imade •
34.

State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested for

10 br otherwise evaluated the affect of the short wheel base of the Jee
11 Commando automobile on its resistance to roll-over either during the
12 Uevelopment of said automobiles or subsequent to the initial
13 (production of said automobiles.

B!

14

uZ
K
w

< t
« B
til X

O *
„ • «
88 * (0

<tf to £ r* eo u.
z o * X ^

35.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

15 laf f irmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance
16 ftfith the definitions preceeding these interrogatories.

s < n 17
?8g
»5«
IA3Z

IU Q n
-J 2 H

.< 5

State whether American Motors Corporation has tested for

°o'g 18 lor otherwise evaluated the effect of the track width of the Jeep

< z 2 *gs
Q

36.

CO W

19 (Commando automobile on its resistance to roll-over, either during
20 the development of said automobile or subsequent to the initial
21 production of said automobiles.
22

37.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

23 affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance
24 with the definitions preceeding these interrogatories.
25

38.

State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested for

26 or otherwise evaluated the affect of the suspension system of the
27 Jeep Commando automobile on its resistance to roll-over, either
28 during the development of said automobiles or subsequent to the
29 initial production of said automobiles.
30

JL(J. If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

31 affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance
32 with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.
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40.

State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested

2 for or otherwise evaluated the effect of the installation of seat
3 belts (either lap, shoulder, or harness type) on the prevention or
4 mitigation of physical injuries arising out of automobile accidents
5 involving the Jeep Commando,
6

41.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

7 affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance
8 with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.
9

42.

State whether American Motors Corporation has, subsequent

10 to the 1972 model year of the Jeep Commando, installed seat belts
11 (either lap, should or harness type) in any models of the Jeep
12 |Commando, and if so, state the reasons therefore.
13

5!

State whether American Motors Corporation ever tested or

14 [otherwise evaluated the strength and/or crash-worthiness of the

*z

? 15 pab enclosures utilized in the production of the Jeep Commando auto-

5*S

n

1 1 1 o 5n 16
Q. °, w M •
* 2 6 N I I iv
z
Z 0 M I a.

52Q

43.

Z S

44.

if the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the

(affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance

H

W Q n o n-

mobile, model years 1970-77 inclusive.

« 18

-J z H . 5
|with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.
.< 3«-o
19
Q gbl
K
*u2
45. If the answer to interrogatry #43 is in the affirmative,
<z2
^ tt

H

20
state in addition whether American Motors Corporation ever tested or

21
otherwise evaluated the potential for physical injury and/or fatalit

22
resulting from the cab enclosure of the Jeep Commando, if said

23
automobile were involved in an automobile accident.

24
46.

If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the

25
affirmative, please identify such tests and/or evaluation in

26
accordance with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.

27
47.

Identify all present or former employees of American Motor

28
Coroporation who participated

in the acutal test driving of the Jeep

29
Commando automobile at any of the American Motors proving ground

30
facilities during the development stages and also subsequently to

31
the initial production of said automobiles.

32
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1

48.

How many accidents in which Jeep Commando automobiles have

2 been involved have been reported to American Motors Corporation
3 |where the general complaint has been that said automobiles have
4 unexpectedly gone out of control or overturned?
5

49.

In reference to the previous interrogatory, supply the

6 following information:
7

a.

Identify each such accident by the name of the person

8 [alleged to have been operating the vehicle in question, and the name
9 pf the owner of said vehicle, and the date and place of the occur10 rence of the accident, and the license number of each and every
11 (vehicle involved;
12

b.

State whether any of said accident have resulted in

13 jlitigation, and if so, identify said litigation by the name of the
14 plaintiffs and defendants, the court in which the action is pending,
5'

15

p docket number, date of filing complaint, and disposition of the

li is

lease.
<M
50. State whether American Motors Corporation employs one or
* 17
o'S
5&
Eg 18 Inore automobile safety engineers on the engineering staff of
5

19 [American Motors Corporation, Jeep Corporation.
20

51.

If the answer to the proceeding interrogatory is in the

21 J L1. ima t ive, identify such persons in accordance with the definitions
22 preceding these interrogatories.
23

52.

Did American Motors Corporation engage any outside

24 engineering services with respect to the development or manufacture
25 |of the Jeep Commando automobile for the production model years 197026 inclusive?
27

53.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

28 affirmative, identify such engineering services in accordance with
29 the definitions regarding the identification of persons which preced
30 these interrogatories.
31

54.

State each and every warranty in particular, whether

32 express or implied and whether oral or written, made to each and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,-10may contain errors.

1

every person who has ever purchased a Jeep Commando automobile

2 for the production model years of 1970-77 inclusive.
3

55.

With reference to the previous interrogatory, state the

4 following information:
5

a.

The substance of each such warranty;

6

b.

State whether the warranty was express or implied;

7

c.

State whether the warranty was written or oral;

8

d.

State the persons or persons to whom such warranties

e.

State the tenure of the person or persons making such

9 were made;
10

11 warranties;
f.

12

State the name and address of the person or persons

13 to whom such warranties were made.
14

56.

State whether American Motors Corporation has ever

15 promulgated any warnings to authorized Jeep dealers and/or purchaser
16 of the Jeep Commando automobile for the production models years 1970
17 inclusive as to any probleMS related to the following information:
18

a.

Handling characteristics;

19

b.

Roll over propensity;

20

c.

Safety roll bars;

21

d.

Seat belts (lap, shoulder or harness type).

22

57.

If the answer to any part of the previous interrogatory is

23 in the affirmative, please supply the following information:
a.

State in detail the particulars and contents of such

26

b.

The name and address of each person so warned;

27

c.

The dates such warnings were made to the people

24
25 warnings;

28 described in b above.
29

d.

Whether such warning was oral or in writing;

30

e.

The name and address of the person or persons who

31 made such warnings.
32

58.

State whether any tests were ever conducted by American

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Motors Corporation at any of its proving ground facilities on the
Jeep Commando automobile wherein said automobile was deliberately or
accidentally rolled over to determine the following qualities of
said automboiles:
a.

Body resistance to impact;

6

b.

Handling characteristics;

7

c.

Performance characteristics for different conditions

8 of:
9
10

Acceleration;

11

Deceleration;

12

Cornering ability,

13

a?

59.

If the answer to any part of the preceding

interrogatories

14 in the affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in

W

Z

ui ^ c
h»S
hi 5;

-«

15 accordance} with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.

o *

H

dt«J"?
* 8 & E « « 16
K
M
Z

Braking;

0

S

DATED this

//

day of March, 1981.

g 8 8 • B fi
17

3g;og|
Q

(f) III

5"S

*

J

18

<z2

19

ii

20

RICHARD B. JOHNSON, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Interrogatories to Mr. Jay E.

21
Jensen, Attorney for defendant Jeep Corporation, 900 Keatns Bldg.,

22
Salt Lake City, Utah

84101; Mr. Timothy R. Hanson, Attorney for

23
VALIC, 650 Clark Leaming Office Center, 175 South West Temple, Salt

24
Lake City, Utah

84L01; Mr. Thomas A Duff in, Attotney for Defendant

25
Anderson, Ten West Broadway Bldg, Suite 510, Salt Lake City, Utah

26
84101; dated this _ / J _

day of March, 1981.

21

28
29
30
31
32
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APPENDIX M C"
Interrogatories to Defendant American Motors,
dated September 15, 1981
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RICHARD B .

1

JOHNSON,

For:

H O W A R D . L E W I S 8t P E T E R S E N
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 EAST 3 0 0

2

NORTH STREET

P. O. Box 778
PROVO. UTAH 84601
TeLEPHONB: 3 7 3 - 6 3 4 8

3
4
5
6

Attorneys for_

Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

7
8

DEBORAH WHITEHEAD AND STEVEN
9 WHITEHEAD,
Plaintiffs,

10

INTERROGATORIES
TO DEFENDANT AMERICAN MOTORS

11
1 2 LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE
[ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
13 klsID AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION, JEEP CORPORATION,
14

Defendants.

Civil No. 5*,036

15
Plaintiffs submit herewith the following interrogatories to be

16

17 answered by the defendant according to the provisions of Rule 3 3 of
18 jthe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure under oath and within thirty (30)
19 Llays of service hereof.

These interrogatories are intended to be

20 [continuing so as to require a supplementation of response to the
21

full, extent required in Rule 26(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce

22 Mure.
DEFINITIONS

23
24
25

The definitions set forth below shall be used for the purposes
jf the.se interrogatories.
L.

The term "you" or "your" shall mean and include the defen-

27 dant and

any employee, officer, agent, attorney or other individual

26

28 [indet the control of American Motors Corporation, Jeep Corporation.
29

2.

The term "document" shall mean and include any letter,

30 [telegram, note, memorandu, record, operating statement, balance
31

^heet, budget, contract, invoice, order, memorandum of any tele-

3 2 phone ot personal conference or conversation, inter-office memoranDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1 dun, microfilm, booklet, circular, pamphlet, study, notice, computer
2 run- or print-out, tape recording of any statement or conversation
3 or transcription of any mechanically recorded statement or conversa4

tion and any other writing of any nature, however produced or repro-

5 duced, including copies of such documents (excepting those documents
6 prepared by legal counsel solely for the purpose of this litigation. )|
7

3.

The term "identify" when used in relation to the term docu-

8 ments, shall require the defendant to state with regard to each
9 document so designated:
10

a.

The date of the documents;

11

b.

The description of the document in sufficient detail

12 to enable it to be specifically

identified;

13

c.

The name of the author of the document;

14

d.

The name and business address of the persons presently

o * 15 having custody of the documents;
ow
<t »

5S

16

e.

The name and business address of each person having

knowledge of any factual assertions reflected in said document;
> a.
0 if

£j! is

f.

The name of each recipient of the document;

19

g.

A statement explaining in reasonable detail the con-

20 tents of the document.
21

4.

The term "identify" when used in referring to individuals

22 or business entities shall mean and require the defendant to state
23 with regard to each individual so designated:
24

a.

The name of the individual or business entity;

25

b.

The present office or home address;

26

d.

The individual's present employer.

27

5.

The term "identify" when used in relation to the terms

28 "test", "studies", or "evaluations", shall require the defendant
29 with regard to each test, study or evaluation so designated:
30

a.

The approximate date such tests, studies or evaluation^

31 were accomplished;
32

b.

The names and addresses of the personnel who con-
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1 ducted such test, studies, or evaluations;
c.

2

The results obtained in conducting such tests, studies,)

3 or evaluations;
d.

4

List any written reports or memoranda which were pre-

5 pared on the basis of such tests, studies or evaluations;
e.

6

The names and addresses of the pesonnel who prepared

7 or authored the documents mentioned in subparagraph d above;
f.

8

The present location and name of the custodian of suc4i

9 document mentioned in subparagraph d above and attach copies.
10

6,

Each paragraph and subparagraph of these interrogatories

11 shall be construed independently and not by reference to any other
12 paragraph or subparagraphs for purposes of limitation.
INTERROGATORIES

13
14

1.

Please identify tiie person answering these interrogatories

and his relationship or position with defendant.
?
« 15
2. With regard to all Jeep Commando vehicles manufactured by
S 16
n
ii

the defendant American Motors Company or its subsidiary Jeep

l 17
X
a.

Corporation for the model years 1970-1973, please furnish the

3 18 number

of all owner reports or consumer complaints from all sources

19 either received by American Motors or of which American Motors is
20 aware, alleging injury or fatality as a result of the malfunction
21 or Lack of (1) a safety roll bar, or (2) non-rigid cab enclosures,
22 including both non-rigid roofs and doors.

Include all reports or

23 complaints, whether or not they have been verified by American Motor^
24

3.

With respect to each owner report or consumer complaint

25 referred to in answer to the previous interrogatory, please identify
26 the contents of each and ovory document in accot dance* with the defi-

27 nitions preceding these interrogatories.
28

4.

Please furnish the number of all owner reports or consumer

29 complaints from all sources either received by American Motors
30 or of which American Motors is otherwise aware alleging injury or
31
fatality resuLting from on-road accidents involving roll-over of

32
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1 Jeep Commando vehicles ot uncontrollability thereof for the model
2 years 1970-73.

Include all reports or complaints, whether or not

3 they have been verified by American Motors Corporation.
4

5.

With respect to each owner report or consumer complaint

5 referred to in answer .to the previous interrogatory, identify the
6 contents of each and every document in accordance with the defini7 tions preceding these interrogatories.

In the alternative, attach

8 a copy of the designated documents.
9

6.

With regard to the accidents, injuries and/or fatalities

10 identified in an answer to interrogatories #2 and 4, specify what
11 investigations American Motors Corporation undertook in regard to
12 [each of said accidents.
13

7.

If American Motors did not undertake any investigation or

14 |other action with regard to the accidents, injuries and/or fatalities)
15 identified in interrogatories #s 2 and 4 but has access to investi16 gations undertaken by Jeep Cot potation involving Jeep Commando
17 vehicles for the model years 1970-73 involving the conditions identi
18 fied in interrogatories #2, and 4 please identify the contents of
19 each and every such document in accordance with the definitions
20 preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative, attach a cop^
21 of said documents.
22

8.

Identify all lawsuits, both pending and closed by title,

23 court, Location and docket number

in which American Motors or Jeep

24 Coiporntion is or was a defendant against allegations of malfunction
25 ot failure of the types listed in interrogatories #2 and 4 involving
26 Jeep Commando vehicles for the model years 1970-73.
27

9.

Identify all claims, both pending and closed, by name and

28 address of the cLaimant in which American Motors was requested to
29 pay damages because of allegations of malfunction or failure of the
30 types indicated in interrogatoties #1, 2 and 4.
31

10.

State what amount, if any, American Motors paid on each of

32 the claims identified in the previous interrogatory.
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11.

State the names and addresses of all persons or groups of

persons at American Motors who have participated in any design
changes in the Jeep Commando automobile for the model years 1970-73.
Give the approximate date when said design changes were accomplished
L2.

Identify the plans, engineering drawings, blueprints and

specifications in their completed or final form that were utilized
in the production and

assembly stages for the following components

of the Jeep Commando automobile for the model years 1970-73:
a.

The roof enclosure;

10

b.

The wheel base and drive-train;

11

c.

The track width of both front and rear axles;

12

d.

Any roll bar or other protective device designed to

13 prevent roof collapse;
14
o 2

-•

e.

Steering mechanism;

f.

Stablizer bars;

g.

Suspension systems;

w

M * <P

o'dl 1 7
*§§
££ 18

h.

Brakes.
13.

With regard to the documents referred to in the previous

19 interrogatory, identify in accordance with the definitions preceding
20 these interrogatories the names and addresses of the person, persons
21 |or group of persons who authored, prepared, supervised and approved
22 MM* documents.
23

14.

State whether American Motors has access to documents whic

24 reflect testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commando automobile
25 for the model years 1970-73 which determined the approximate or
26 exact position of the center of gravity for said vehicles under
27 different passenger load conditions.
28

15.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory was in the

29 affirmative, please state the approximate, or if known, the exact
30 Location of the center of gravity in the Jeep Commando automobiles
31 (produced for the model years 1970-73 inclusive, for passenger load
32 conditions varying from 0-4 passengers inclusive, or in the alterDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l
2
3

native, attach a copy of said documents.
16.

State the approximate standard passenger weight employed

in answering the previous inter rogatory, and also the passenger

4 distribution pattern in the automobiles for each model.
5

17.

State whether American Motors Corporation has access to

6 documents which reflect testing by the Jeep Corporation of the Jeep
7 Commando automobile for the model years 1970-73 to evaluate the
8 tendency of said automobile to either undetsteer or oversteer at
9 different operating conditions.
10

IB.

If the answer to the preceding interrogatory was in

11 the affirmative, identify such documents in accordance with the
12 (definitions preceding these interrogatories or in the alternative
13 attach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories.
14
0

19.

State whether American Motors Corporation lias access to

[documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep
2 15
16 Commando automobile for the model years 1970-73 evaluating the
17 [operational directional stability or handling characteristics of

S*
18 said automobile under real or simulated cross wind conditions.
19

20.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

20 la f f ir mat ive, identify such documents and/or evaluations in accordance^
21 with the definitions ptecoding these interrogatories or in the
22 [alternative attach a copy of the same to your answers to interroga23 tor ies.
24

21.

State whether American Motors Corporation has access to

25 [documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep
26 [Commando automobile for the model years 1970-73 evaluating the
27 jaero-dynamic stability of said automobiles.
28

22.

It" the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

29 laffit mative f please identify such documents in accordance with the
30 definitions preceding these interrogatories or in the alternative
31 [attach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories.
32

23.

State what instructions were included in any manual or
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1 other document which was given to the consumer of a certain 1972
2 Jeep Commando, VIN JLA 87H VH21309, which stated any particular
3 problem or problems relating to vehicle handling characteristics
4 jwhich might be encountered in driving or operating said automobiles
5 Please outline in detail such instructions or attach a copy thereof
6

24.

State whether American Motors Corporation has access to

7 [documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandcj
8 automobile for the model years 1970-73 evaluating the effect of
9 safety loll bars in said automobiles as related to the prevention of
10 physical injuries and/or fatalities to the passengers in said
11 lautomobiles in the event of a roll-over or other accident.
12

25.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

13 |affirmative, identify such documents in accordance with the defini14 tions preceding these interrogatories or in the alternative attach
|a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories.

o2

- »°

£ * •?

26.

State whether American Motors Corporation has access to

"DM

o j 17 (documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandd
••Sft
£2 18 iautomobiLe for model years 1970-73 evaluating the effect of the short)
19 |wheel base of said automobile on its resistance to toll-over.
20

27.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

21 |aft irmative, identify such documents in accordance with the defini22 tions preceding these interrogatories or in the alternative attach a
23 k:opy of same to yout answers to interrogatories.
24

28.

State whether American Motors Corporation has access to

25 documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandc
26 'automobile Cor model years 1970-73 evaluating the effect of the
27 track width of the Jeep Commando automobile on its resistance to
28 roll-over.
29

29.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

30 laffirmative, identify such documents in accordance with the
31 (definitions preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative,
32 attach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories.
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30.

State whether American Motors Corporation has access to

documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandc!
automobile Cot model years 1970-73 evaluating the effect of the
suspension system of the Jeep Commando automobile on its resistance
to roll-over.
31.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

affirmative, identify such documents in accordance with the
[definitions preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative,
attach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories.

10

32.

State whether American Motors Corporation has access to

11 |documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandc)
12 for the model years 1970-7 3 evaluating the strength and/or crash13 Iworthiness of the cab enclosures utilized in the production of said
14 lautomobi les.
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33.

If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the

16 laffitmative, identify such documents in accordance with the

^ 17 jdefinitions preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative,

IA3Z

| 8 8 * Eg 18 jattach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories.
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19

34.

tf the answer to interrogatory #33 is in the affirmative,

20 state in addition whether American Motors Corporation has access to
21 documents reflecting testing by Jeep Corporation of the Jeep Commandc
22 automobile for model years 1970-73 evaluating the potential for
23 physical injury and/or fatality resulting from the cab enclosure of
24 said automobile, if said automobile were inovlved in an accident.
25

35.

If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the

26 af I: it mat ive, please identify such documents in accordance with the
27 definitions preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative,
28 attach a copy of same to your answers to interrogatories.
29

36.

State whether American Motors Corporation has access to

30 documents in the possession of Jeep Corporation reflecting the
31 identity of all present or former employees of American Motors
32 Corporation who participated in the actual test-driving of the Jeep
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1 Commando automobile for model years 1970-73.

2

37.

If the answers to the preceding interrogatory was in the

3 affirmative, please identify such documents in accordance with the
4 definitions preceding these interrogatories, or in the alternative,
5 attach a copy of the same to your answers to interrogatories.
6

38.

State whether American Motors Corporation has access to

7 documents reflecting the identities of the engineering firms and/or
8 individual engineers responsible for the design of the wheel base,
9 track width, suspension system, and cab enclosures for the Jeep
10 (Commando automobile.
11

39.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory was in the

12 [affirmative, identify such documents in accordance with the defini13 tions regarding the identification of persons which precede these
14 inter rogator ies.
5 15

DATED this

day of September, 1981.

n
e

S

16

<£

I 17

riCHARD B. JOHNSOiy For:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Z
6.

3 18
19

MAILED a copy of the foregoing Interrogatories to Mr. Jay E.

20 |Jensen, Attorney for defendant Jeep Corporation, 900 Kearns Bldg.,
21 Salt Lake City, Utah

84101; Mr. Timothy R. Hanson, Attorney for

22 VALIC, 650 Clark Learning Office Center, 175 South West Temple, Salt
23 Lake City, Utah

8410L; Mr. Thomas A. Duffin, Attorney for Defendant

24 Anderson, Ten West Broadway Bldg., Suite 510, Salt Lake City, Utah
25 84101; Mr. Glen Hanni, Attorney at Law, 600 Boston Bldg., Salt Lake
26 City, Utah
27
28
29

84111; dated this

/^

day of September, 1981.
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RICflARD B . JOHNSON, FOR:

1
2

H O W A R D , L E W I S 8e P E T E R S E N
ATTORNEYS A N D C O U N S E L O R S AT L A W
1 2 0 EAST 3 0 0 NORTH STREET
P . O . BOX 7 7 8
PROVO. U T A H 8 4 6 0 1
TELEPHONE: 3 7 3 . 6 3 4 8

3
4
5
6

Attorneys for

Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

7
8

DEBORAH WHITEHEAD AND STEVEN

9 WHITEHEAD,
Plaintiffs,

10
11

INTERROGATORIES
TO DEFENDANT JEEP CORPORATION

vs.

12 LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

13 AND AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION, JEEP CORPORATION,

14
Defendants.

Civil No. 34-T-eerj—

15
16

Plaintiffs submit herewith the following inter rogatories to be

17 answered by the defendant Jeep Corporation according to the pro18 visions of Ruie 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure under oath
•
*
19
|and within thirty (30) days of service hereof.

These interroga-

20
21
22
23
24

tories are intended to be continuing so as to require a supplementation of response to the full extent required in Rule 26(e) of
the Utah Rules of CiviL Procedure.
DEFINITIONS
The definitions set forth below shall be used for the purposes

25 |of these interrogatories.
26

L.

The term "you" or "your" shall mean and include the defen-

27 dant and any employee, officet, agent, attorney or other individual
28 pndei the control of Jeep Corporation.
29

2.

When an interrogatory requests information regarding

30 (testing or investigation by Jeep Corporation on the Jeep Commando
31 hutomobiie, such request includes a request for all testing done on
32 Jeep Commando automobiles for the model years 1966-73, including
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

testing done by Jeep Corporation's predecessor, Kaiser Jeep

2 Corporation.
3

3.

The term "document" shall mean and include any letter,

4 telegram, note, memorandum, record, operating statement, balance
5 sheet, budget, contract, invoice, order, memorandum of any tele6 phone or personal conference or conversation, inter-office memoran7 dun, microfilm, booklet, circular, pamphlet, study, notice, computer8 tun- or- print-out, tape recording of any statement or conversation
9 or transcription of any mechanically recorded statement or conversa10 tion and any other writing of any nature, however produced or repro11 duced, including copies of such documents (excepting those documents
12 prepared by legal counsel solely for the purpose of this litigation.)]
13

4.

The term "identify" when used in relation to the term docu-

14 ments, shall require the defendant to state with regard to each
5 15 {document so designated:
n
9

S 16

a«

The date of the documents;

b.

The descr iption of the document in sufficient detail

hi

§ 17
I

to enable it to be specifically

identified;

j 18
c.

The name of the author of the document;

d.

The name and business address of the persons presently

19
20
having custody of the documents;

21
e.

The name and business address of each person having

22
knowledge of any factual assertions reflected in said document;

23
f.

The name of each recipient of the document;

g.

A statement explaining in reasonable detail the con-

24
25
tents of the document.

26
5.

The term "identify" when used in referring to individuals

21
[or business entities shall mean and require the defendant to state

28
with regard to each individual so designated:

29
a.

The name of the individual or- business entity;

b.

The present office or home address;

c.

The individual's present employer.

30
31
32

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6.

The term "identify" when used in relation to the terms

"test", "studies", or "evaluations", shall require the defendant
with regard to each test, study or evaluation so designated:
a.

The approximate date such tests, studies or evaluation*!

were accomplished;
b.

The names and addresses of the personnel who con-

ducted such test, studies, or evaluations;
c.

The results obtained in conducting such tests, studies

or evaluations;
d.

10
11

pared on the basis of such tests, studies or evaluations;
e.

12
13

ti

List any written reports or memoranda which were pre-

The names and addresses of the pesonnel who prepared

oi ntithot cd the documents mentioned in subparagraph d above;

14

f.

The present location and name of the custodian of such

OIK

K< S
5 15
n
tqS 2»
a-d x » 3
R 16
Wing

document mentioned in subparagraph d above and attach copies.
7.

Each paragraph and subparagraph of these interrogatories

*£§;;* o
* 8 g ° 5 I 17 shall be construed independently and not by reference to any other
2 2 z o<

wojog

Z
a.

y «i w

« 18

K

>•

n
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oc

a.

OP

19

5

20

x

paragraph or subpaiagraphs for purposes of limitation.
INTERROGATORIES
1.

Please identify the person answering these interrogatories

21 and his relationship or position with defendant.
22

2.

With regard to ail Jeep Commando vehicles manufactured

23 by Jeep Corporation for model years 1966-73, please furnish the
24 number of all owner reports or consumer complaints from all sources
25 either received by Jeep Corporation or of which Jeep Corporation
26 is aware alleging injury or fatality as a result of the malfunction
27 or lack of (1) a safety roll bar; (2) non-rigid cab enclosures,
28 including both non-rigid roofs and doors; or (3) general instability
29 causing roll-overs.

Include all reports or complaints, whether or

30 not they have been veiified by Jeep Corporation.
31

3.

With respect to each owner report or consumer

complaint

32 referied to in answer to the pievious interrogatory, please identify
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

the contents of each and every document in accordance with the

2 definitions preceding these interrogatories.

3

4.

Specify what inveshigat ions.Jeep Corporation undertook

4

in regard to each of the accidents, injuries and/or fatalities,

5

identified in ans-wer to interrogatory #2.

6
7

5.

Specify with particularity the results of Jeep Corporation' sj

investigation into the accidents, injuries and/or fatalities identi-

8 fied in answer to interrogatory #2.
9

6.

Identify all lawsuits, both pending and closed by title,

10 court, Location and docket number in which Jeep Corporation is or
11 was a defendant against allegations of malfunction or failure of
12 the types listed in interrogatory #4, involving Jeep Commando
13 vehicles for the model years 1966-73.

i§
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Identify all claims, both pending and closed, by name and

address of the claimant in which Jeep Corporation was requested to

1G

pay damages because of aiiegations of malfunction or- failure of the

*8g* 2"
III
-J
.
Q
K

7.

-i r
J-«-'

types indicated in interrogatory 2.

£2 18

8.

State what amount, if any, Jeep Corporation paid on each of

>a

19 the claims identified in the previous interrogatory.

°2

20

9.

State the name and addresses of all persons or groups of

21 persons at Jeep Corporation and Kaiser Jeep Corporation who par22 ticipated in the design, manufacture and sale of the Jeep Commando
23 automobile for the model years 1966-73.
24

10.

Identify the plans, engineering drawings, blue prints and

25 specifications in their completed or final form that were utilized
26 in the production and assembly stages for the following components
27 of the Jcr.p Commando automobile for the model years 1966-73:
28

a.

The roof enclosure;

29

b.

The wheel base and drive-train;

30

c.

The track width of both front and rear axels;

31

d.

Any roll bar or other protective device designed to

32 prevent roof collapse;
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

e.

Steeting mechanism;

2

f.

Stabilizer bars;

3

g.

Suspension systems;

4

h.

Brakes.

5

11.

With regard to the documents referred to in the previous

6

interrogatoryr identify in accordance with the definitions preceding

7

these interrogatories the names and addresses of the person, persons

8 or group of pet sons who authored, prepared, supervised and approved
9 the documents.
10

12.

State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation

11 determined the approximate or exact position of the center of gravit
12 for any or all Jeep Commando automobiles for the model years 1966-73
13 inclusive, under different passenger load conditions.
14

13.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory was in the

15 affirmative, please state the approximate, or if known, the exact
16 location of the center of gravity in the Jeep Commando automobiles
17 produced for the model years 1966-73 inclusive, for passenger load
18 conditions varying from 0-4 passengers inclusive.
19

14.

State the approximate standard passenger weight employed

20 in answering the previous intetrogatory, and also the passenger dis21 tribution pattern in the automobiles for each model.
22

1 r>.

State the approximate, or iE known, the exact location of

23 the center of gravity on a certain 1972 Jeep Commando, VIN JLA 87H
24 VH21309, for all passenger

load conditions varying from 0-4 pas-

25 sengers inclusive.
26

16.

With reference to the design and development of the Jeep

27 Commando automobile for model years 1966-73, state whether Jeep
28 Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation tested for or otherwise
29

leteimined the handling characteristics and qualities of said

30 [automobiles both during the development and subsequently to the
31 initial production of said automobiles.
32

17.

If the answer to interrogatory #18 is in the affirmative,
-5-
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1

please supply the following additional information:

2

a.

With respect to the handling qualities and charac-

3

teristics of said Jeep Commando automobiles, what safety standards

4

and criteria were utiLized by Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Cor-

5 poration in designing and developing said automobiles;
6
7

b.

Whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation

tested for or evaluated the tendency of said Jeep Commando auto-

8 mobi Les for the model years 1966-73 to either under steer or over9 steer at different operating conditions;
10

c.

If the answer to b above is in the affirmative, state

11 specifically how such tests and evaluations were accomplished.
12

18.

State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation

13 ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the directional stability or

si

14 handling characteristics of the Jeep Commando automobile for model

K< t
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g

55 15 years 1966-73 under impact conditions.
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19.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

bw
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affirmative, identify all such tests and/or evaluations in accord-

0 w

£» 18 ance with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.
19
20. State whethoi Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation

<2°

*sOO
x

$

20 ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the operational directional
21 stability or handling characteristics of the Jeep Commando for the
22 model years 1966-73 automobile under real or simulated cross wind
23 conditions.
24

21.

If the answer- to the previous interrogatory is in the

25 affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance
26 with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.
27

22.

State whether' Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation

28 ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the aerodynamic stability of
29 the Jeep Commando automobile for model years 1966-73.
30

23.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory was in the

31 affirmative, please identify such tests and/or- evaluations in
32 accordance with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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24.

State what instructions were included in any manual or

2 other document which was given to the consumer of a certain 1972
3 Jeep Commando automobile VIN JLA 87H VH21309 which stated any par4 ticular problem or problems relating to vehicle handling character5 istics which might be encountered in driving or operating said
6 automobiles.

Please outline in detail such instructions or attach

7 a copy thereof.
8

25.

State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation

9 ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the effect of safety roll
10 bars in Jeep Commando automobiles for model years 1966-73 as related
11 to the prevention of physical injuries and/ or fatalities to the
12 passengers in said automobiles in the event of a roll-over or other
13 accident.

zl

14

hi -J

26.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

K <t

5 15 affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance

Ul » Jjj

UJ

q oi

n-ri x

03 5 »
^

09 .1

^xS 16 with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.

*si • S i

27.

(A 3 Z

58§ oo'l
ui 8

ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the effect of the short wheel

Q

J Z H

- < » £{i 18

2?S
$S~
> tt

5

base of the Jeep Commando automobile for model years 1966-73 on its

19
resistance to roll-over- either during the development of said

00

x

State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation

17

20
21
22

automobiles or subsequent to the initial production of said
automobiles.

2ft. Tf the answer- to the previous interrogatory is in the
23
24 affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance
25 with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.
26

29.

State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation

27 ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the effect of the track width
28 jof the Jeep Commando automobile for model years 1966-73 on its
29 resistance to roll-over , either during the development of said
30 automobiLe or subsequent to the initial production of said
31 automobiles.
32

30.

rf the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the
-7-
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affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance
with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.
31.

State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation

ever tested for or otherwise evaluated the effect of the suspension
system of the Jeep Commando automobile on its resistance to rollover, for model yearn 1966-73.
32.

If the answer to the previous interrogatory is in the

affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance
with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.

10

33.

State whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation

11 ever tested or otherwise evaluated the strength and/or crash12 worthiness of the cab enclosures utilized in the production of the
13 Jeep Commando automobile for model years 1966-73.
z*<

14

U J
WH .
K < {J

34.

If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the

111 0) g
tt ?

b

»- d
*w

55 15 affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in accordance
§3
5S
6
fers *S I
with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.

s«|§ g 2?
D u

35. If the answer to interrogatory #33 is in the affirmative,
283° -i 17
s§
state in addition whether Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Cor2 ««*>

Wono 0
-I Z H .

Jz2
00

It

£« i s

19 poration ever tested or otherwise evaluated the potential for physic.
20

injury and/or fatality resulting from the cab enclosure of the Jeep

21 Commando, if said automobile were involved in an automobile accident

22
23

for model years 1966-73.
36.

If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the

24 affirmative, please identify such tests and/or evaluation in accord25 ance with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.

26

37.

Identify a L1 present or former employees of Jeep Cor-

21 poration or Kaiser Jeep Corporation who participated in the actual
28

test (hiving of the Jeep Commando automobile for model years 1966-73

29 at any proving ground facilities during the development stages and
30 aLso subsequently to the initial production of said automobiles.
31

38.

State how many accidents in which Jeep Commando automobiles

32 for model years 1966-73 have been involved have been reported to
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Jeep Corporation or Kaiser Jeep Corporation where the general
complaint has been that said automobiles have unexpectedly gone out
of control or overturned.
39.

In reference to the previous interrogatory, supply the

folLowing information:
a.

Identify each such accident by the name of the person

alleged to have been operating the vehicle in question, and the name
of the owner of said vehicle, and the date and place of the occurrence of the accident, and the license number of each and every

10 vehicle involved;
11

b.

State whether any of said accident have resulted in

12 litigation, and if so, identify said litigation by the name of the
13 plaintiffs and defendants, the court in which the action is pending,

l\

14 a docket number , date of filing complaint, and disposition of the

W I-

K< C
k l <n M
tt £

b

55 15 case .
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ci 5 -
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SE
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16

40.

State whether Jeep Corporation or- Kaiser Jeep Corporation

17 has ever promulgated any warnings to authorize Jeep dealers and/or
18 purchasers of the Jeep Commando automobile for the production models
19 years 1966-73 inclusive as to any problems related to the following
20 information:
21

a.

Handling characteristics;

22

b.

Roil over propensity;

23

c.

Safety roll bars;

24

41.

If the answer to any part of the previous interrogatory is

25 in the affirmative, please supply the following information:
26

a.

State in detail the particulars and contents of such

28

b.

The name and address of each person so warned;

29

c.

The dates such warnings were made to the people

27 war ni ngs ;

30 described in b above.
31

d.

Whether- such warning was oral or in writing;

32

e.

The name and address of the person or persons who
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

occ:

made such warnings.
42.

State whether any tests were ever conducted by Jeep Cor-

poration or Kaiser Jeep Corporation at any of its proving ground
facilities on the Jeep Commando automobile for model years 1966-73
wherein said automobile was deliberately or accidentaily rolled over
to determine the following qualities of said automobiles:
a.

Body resistance to impact;

b.

Handling characteristics;

c.

Performance characteristics for different conditions

10 of:
11

1.

Braking;

12

2.

Acceleration;

13

3.

Deceleration;

z?

4. Cornering ability.
14
aui w< g.S
43. If the answer to any part of the preceding interrogatories
15
tu q S oS
to w
°-ni xg
16 is in the affirmative, identify such tests and/or evaluations in
hi-J
CD l -

SA § S 5

g8g"
UI Q n O
-J Z H .
• < 5 o.

s?;

17 accordance with the definitions preceding these interrogatories.

S*
§3 18
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00

19
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20

DATED this

£§

day of

<^tX\WmSA

, 1981.

RICHARD B. JOHNSC^T, FOR:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

21
22
23

MAILING CERTIFICATE

24

MAILED a copy of the foregoing to Mr. Glen Hanni, Attorney

25 at Law, 600 Boston Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111; Mr.- Jay E.
26 Jensen, Attorney for defendant American Motors, 900 Kearns Bldg.,
27 Salt Lake City, Utah, 8410L; Mr. Timothy R. Hanson, Attorney for
28 defendant VALIC, 650 Clark Learning Office Center, 175 South West
29 Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101; and Mr. Thomas A. Duffin,
30 Attoiney tor defendant Anderson, Ten West Broadway Bldg., Suite 410,
31 SaLt Lake City, Utah, 84101, postage prepaid, this c^/day of
32

1981.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law"SECRETARY
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law^School, BYU.
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RICHARD

. ' HNSON, FOR:

HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120

EAST 3 0 0

NORTH STREET

P. O. BOX 7 7 8
PROVO, UTAH 84603
TELEPHONE: 3 7 3 - 6 3 4 3

Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f s

,,/

J^
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAirCOUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD AND STEPHEN :
WHITEHEAD,
:

INTERROGATORIES

Plaintiffs,
vs.
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIABLE
!ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Jand AMERICAN MOTOR SALES
CORPORATION, JEEP CORPORATION,:
I

Defendants.

:

Civil No. 53046

The plaintiffs herebv request that the defendant, Jeep Corporation, answer the following interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure within thirtv (30) davs of
service hereof.

These interrogatories' are to be deemed continuing

so as to require a supplementation of response to the full extent
specified in Rule 26(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
1.

Please state the name of each person who vou expect mav b

called as an expert witness on behalf of the plaintiffs at the
trial of this cause of action against the above-named defendants.
I

2. For each such expert as named above in the preceding

'interrogator, please state:
A.

His or her name, or other means of identification,

address and present telephone number.
3. His or her profession or occupation, and the field in

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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S£

1
2
3
4

which he or she i s a l l e g e d l v an e x p e r t .
C.

5

i

6

documents, records, memoranda, correspondence, or anv other tangible

7

corn of documentation, recordation or communication which was

8

analvzed or examined.
D.

9
10
11

si

The name or d e s c r i p t i o n of the p r o d u c t s , o b j e c t s ,

12

Whether vou intend to call him as a witness during

<

the trial of this cause, of action.
ANSWER THE FOLLOWING INTERROGATORIES SEPARATELY FOR EACH PERSON
|! REFERRED TO IN THE PRECEDING INTERROGATORIES, IDENTIFYING THE

tn H „

KS§5
°>*

CD 10

o *

^ © «
eo <r 0

13 iPERSON 3Y NAME.

"•:U ^

o«
"x?
14
Z g<"
(D 2
n 1- ..
3 8 8 3 15
cB a) x

3.

Has the expert, had a formal education in his or her field?

4.

If so, state:

a s : °dS 16
o-:a »§3
S =

A. The name and address of each school where he or she

Ms

17 received special education or training in this field.

5*
x§2
5

18

B.

19

C. The name or description of each degree he received,

The dates when he attended each school.

20 including the date when each was received and the name of the
21 school from which he received said degree.
22

5.

Did he have anv other specialized training in his field?

23

6.

If so, state:

24

A.

The tvpe of training he received.

25

3. The name and address of the school or place where he

26 received this training.
C. The dates when he received this training.

27
28

7.

Is he or she a member of anv professional or trade associ.a-
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OOrO

ion in his or her field?
8.

If so, state:
A.

The name of each professional or trade association.

3.

The date he or she became a member thereof.

C.

A description of each office he or she has held in

each association.
9.

Has he or she written anv books, papers, or articles on

subject to his field?
10.

11.

If so, for each book, paper, and article, state:
A.

The title and subject matter thereof.

B.

The name and address of the publisher.

C.

The date of publication.

Has he or she practiced or worked in the field which he

jclaims to be an expert in during the past ten vears?
12.

If so, state:
A.

Whether he was self-employed, emploved bv someone

else, or associated as a partner.

13.

3.

Each address where he practiced or was emploved.

C.

The dates he was with each emplover.

D.

The tvpe of dutv he performed with each emplover.

If he has not practiced or worked in his field during

the last ten vears, what was his emplovment during this time.
14.

What experience, other than that stated above, has he had

in his field.
15.

Has he had anv previous experience in his field which
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~~

QRc

[involved problems to chose encountered in thsi action?
!

15.

If so, describe each similar problem with which he has had

[

i

| experience?
I

17.

Identifv, with specificitv, each and everv document,

[memoranda, correspondence, record, or other tangible form of documentation, recordation, or communication which have been submitted
!to, or made available to him or her for purposes of forming an
opinion relative to the issues which have been raised in the complaint filed in this cause of action, including but not limited to *
llost earnings, loss of prospective income, and damages.
"18.

What facts or information were vou seeking in having said

[examinations conducted?
19.
|

*

<

Did this expert submit a report of his objective findings/

20.

i

.

If so, state:
*

j

A.

The date this report was submitted.

I

3.

The name or other identification of the person to

i

whom this report was submitted.
C.

4

The name and address of the person who has present

custodv of this report.
21.

Did he submit anv other reports whatsoever, based on the

tests analvses, or examinations that he conducted relevant to this .
lawsuit.
22.

If so, state with particularitv:
A.

A description of each report that was made.
i

B.

The date that each report was made.
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C.

The name or other means of identification, the person

to whom each report was submitted.
D.

The name and address of the person who has present

custodv of each report.
DATED this 3

dav of August:, 1983.

^U^L**/^

^h^s\^

RICHARD 3. JOHNSON, FOR:
HOWARD. LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attornevs for Plaintiffs
MAILED a copv of the foregoing INTERROGATORIES to:
Mr. Jav Jensen
Attorney for Defendant American Sales
and Jeep Corporation
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84101
Mr. J. Anthonv Evre
Attornev for Plaintiffs
600 Commercial Club 3uilding
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 8411
Mr. Glenn C. Hanni
Attornev at Law
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake Citv, Utah

84111

Mr. Thomas A. Duffin
Western Home Bank Bldg., 3rd Floor
30 South State
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 34111
Attornevs for Defendant Anderson
Mr. Terrv M. Plant
Attornev for Defendant Variable Annuitv
175 South West Temple #650
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 34101
dated this

av of August, 1933.
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Fff

Defendant Anderson's Interrogatories to
Defendant American Motors/Jeep Corporation,
dated April 5, 1983
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Glenn C. Hanni
Stuart H. Schultz
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant Anderson
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

—-1-

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DEBORAH WHITEHEAD and
STEPHEN WHITEHEAD,

)

Plaintiffs,

DEFENDANT ANDERSON'S
INTERROGATORIES TO DE?ENDANr
AMERICAN MOTORS/JEEP
CORPORATION

v.
LARRY ANDERSON, VARIA3LE
ANNUITY LIFE INSURANCE CO.
]
and AMERICAN MOTOR SALES
CORPORATION, JEEP CORPORATION,

Civil No.

53,046

Defendants.
Defendant Larry Anderson, pursuant to Rule 33, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, submits the following Interrogatories
to defendant American Motors/Jeep Corporation, to be answered
under oath and in writing within 30 days of the date of service
hereof:
1.

State the name, address and telephone number of

each and every person you may call as a witness at the trial
of the above-captioned matter.

Include a brief synopsis of the

substance of each such person's testimony.
2.

State the name, address and telephone number of
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each and every person you may call as an expert witness at the
trial of the above-captioned matter.

Include a brief synopsis

of the substance of such person's testimony, and set forth the
qualifications, training, education, and experience of each
such person.
3.

Identify each document or thing you may introduce

as an exhibit at the trial of the above-captioned matter.
Identify each such proposed exhibit by name, deposition exhibit
number, or description of content, and also identify the present
location of all such exhibits, and the person in control of
such exhibits.
DATED this 5th day of April, 1983.
STRONG & HANNI

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of April, 1983
true and correct copies of the foregoing Interrogatories were
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
J. Anthony Eyre, Esq.
KIPP and CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Deborah Whitehead
600 Commercial Club Buildincr
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Jackson Howard, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P. 0. Box: 778
Provo, Utah 84 601
Thomas A, Duffin, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant Anderson
Western Home Bank Building
Third Floor
300 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jay E. Jensen, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant American
Sales & Jeep Corporation
900 Reams Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Terry M. Plant, Esq.
Attorney for Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Company
175 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Secretary
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